Szqoreme Court of Minnesota.

STREISSGUTH R, AL.
V.

NATIONAL GERMAN-AMERICAN BANK.
When a bank receives a draft for collection, it enters into an implied
contract to perform such duties as are necessary for the protection of the
customer.
A bank is not exempt from the principle of law, that every person is
liable for the acts of such agents as he appoints to transact the business
he undertakes to perform.

Appeal from District Court of Ramsey County; Bmu.,
Judge.
The complaint set forth that the defendant was a banking corporation organized and doing business in St. Paul,
Minnesota, as a national bank, and that the plaintiffs were
merchants, copartners engaged in business at St. Paul. That
it had been the custom and usage of the defendant for more
tlian five years past to receive from its customers and patrons, among whom were the plaintiffs, for collection and to
collect for them, all drafts and checks left with it for collection, and in collecting the same from parties at a distance,
to transmit the same to the correspondents and agents of the
defendant, located and doing business in the vicinity of and
generally nearest to the party or parties from whom such
collections were to be made. In November, 1888, the plaintiffs drew their draft upon Kelley and Riley, merchants at
Lake Crystal, Minnesota, for the sum of one hundred and
thirty-seven dollars and fifty-two cents, payable at sight, and
delivered the same to the defendants for collection, who
agreed to collect the same, the draft being made payable to
their order. The defendant forwarded the draft to its correspondent and agent, the State Bank at Lake Crystal, for
collection, who presented the same and received the amount
therein stated to be paid. After the amount had been paid
to the Lake Crystal Bank, it became insolvent, and never
paid and was wholly unable to pay the amount or any part
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thereof. The plaintiffs had made repeated demands for payment of the sum collected, but the defendant refused to pay,
and this action was brought to recover the amount of the
draft together with interest, costs and disbursements.
The defendant denied that it had been its custom to collect all checks and drafts left with it for collection, or to
guarantee the collection thereof, or to do more than use due
diligence and exercise ordinary prudence in making efforts to>
collect the same, and also, that it ever had any correspondents or agents for the transaction of such business, but,
whenever such paper 'was received for collection, it had forwarded the same to the nearest bank of good standing and
credit to the party or parties from whom such collections
were to be made, and if collected, to receive the proceeds of
said drafts or checks and pay them over to their customers,
or carry the proceeds thereof to the credit of customers on
their books, as directed. Defendant also denied that the
State Bank was its agent, and alleged that at the time the
draft was forwarded it was a State bank of good standing
and credit, and averred the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and that the collection was in its ordinary course of
business. There was also a denial of the receipt of any consideration whatever, such collections being merely for the
convenience of customers.
The Court found that the State Bank at Lake Crystal was
the sub-agent of the defendant, and that the defendant was
liable for its default in failing to pay over the money collected by it, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs.
W.
WH. Sanborn, for appellant.
j. B.
Young &' Liganer, for respondents.
COLLINS,

J., Feb. 24, 189o.

The single questionpresented

by this appeal is whether a bank, with which a customer has
left for collection his draft upon a party residing at some distant point, can be held responsible for the failure and default
of a correspondent to whom the bank has forwarded the
draft for collection. It must be admitted that there is apparently a great conflict of precedents upon this precise ques-
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tion, and it is possible that, as contended by the appellant,
the weight of the authorities, numerically speaking, is with
the proposition that when, under such circumstances, a bank
has exercised ordinary care and prudence in the selection of
a correspondent to whom it transmits a draft, bill, or note for
collection, and remittance of the proceeds, its liability terminates, because, as it is necessary and customary, and in the
usual course of business, for banks to collect through correspondents, of which necessity, custom, and course of business the owners and holders of paper have full notice and
knowledge, it must be held that they have assented to, and
authorized the work of collection through others. The
question involves a rule of general application and of commercial law. As it concerns trade between different and distant places, and, in the absence of a statute or contract or
usage which has obtained the force of law, is not to be determined according to the views or interests of any particular persons, classes, or localities, it should be decided according to those principles which govern and best promote the
general welfare of the entire commercial community, and in
accordance with the general principles which apply to all
-who contract to perform a service.
When the appellant received the draft for collection, it
-entered into a contract, by implication, to perform such duties as were necessary for the protection of its customer. It
agreed to collect the paper itself, not to procure the services
of another to make the collection. The plaintiffs had no
voice in the selection of appellant's agent or correspondent,
and it is difficult to see why banks and banking-houses
should be excepted from the operation of a cardinal and wellestablished principle of law that every person is liable for
the acts of such agents as may be appointed or designated
by him to transact such business as he has undertaken to
perform for others. The appellant, having undertaken the
collection of the paper, stands in the attitude of an independent contractor who, having unrestrained liberty so to do,
has designated a sub-agent, and is therefore answerable for his
neglect, failure or default. It is true that in the adjudicated
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cases cited by the appellant strong arguments are found, and
cogent reasons stated, in support of its position; but we are
of the opinion that the conclusion we have reached is the
sounder one upon principle. It is also sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the courts of last resort of several of the States, including that of the great commercial center, New York. It is also the rule in England:
Exchange Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank (1884), 112 U. S.
276 ; Allen v. Bank (1839), 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 215; Ayrault
v. Bank (1872), 47 N. Y. 570; Si;"Pson v. Waldby (1886),
63 Mich. 439; Tius v. Bank (1871), 35 N. J. Law, 588;
Reeves v. Bank (1858), 8 Ohio St. 465; Tyson v. Bank
(1842), 6 Blackf (Ind.) 225; ExPress Co. v. Haire (1863),
21 Ind. 4; Mackersy v. Ramsays (1843), 9 Clark & F . 818;
Van Wart v. Woolley (1824), 3 Barn. & C. 439.

Judgment affirmed.
The law upon the question of the
liability of a bank for the acts of
its correspondents is in an unsatisfactory state, yet it would seem
that the principal case, although
not supported by the weight of
authority declares the better law.
It is a general rule of law, that,
although the principal is not ordinarily liable (for he sometimes is)
in a criminal suit, for the acts or
misdeeds of his agent, unless, iudeed he has authorized or co-operated in those acts or misdeeds;
yet, he is held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds,
deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and
other malfeasances, or misfeasances
and omissions of duty, of his agent,
in the course of his employment,
although the principal did not
authorize, or justify, or participate
in, or, indeed, know of such misconduct, or even if he forbade the
acts, or disapproved of them : Story
on Agency 452. The maxim is
" resfiondeat superior," and as ex-

pressed by Lord Chief Justice
Kr.Tyox in Ellis v. Turner (I8oO),
8 Term. 533,-" The defendants
are responsible for the acts of their
servants in those things that respect
his duty under them, though they
are not answerable for his misconduct in those things that do not respect their duty to them :" This
liability of the principal for the
misfeasances, and negligences, and
torts of his agents andservants, extends not only to the injuries and
wrongs of the agent who is immediately employed by the principal in
a particular business, but also to the
injuries and wrongs done by others,
who are employed by that agent
inder him, or with whom he contracts for the performance of the
business; for the liability reaches
through all the stages of the service: Story, 454.
The law, as thus defined, was applied in the principal case to a bank,
with which a customer had left for
collection, his draft upon a party
residing at a distance. In principle.
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as well as theory, it would seem
that such decision is correct, for the
maxim, respondeal suferior, is of
universal application, and quifacil
peralium facit per se, is the rule
applicable to all cases in which one
engages another to perform an undertaking or a service for him.
Notwithstanding this, however, the
courts in this country are much divided in opinion upon the question,
and numerically speaking, their decisions may be said to be against
the principle above laid down; so
much so, that only five of the
States support this ruling; yet tle
fact must not be lost sight of, that
their decisions although in the minority are supported by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The theory contended for by the
bank in the principal case, and supported by the majority of the deAcisions in the State Courts, is, that a
home bank, receiving from its customers foreign paper for collection,
is relieved from liability, if, in the
selection of its correspondents to
whom it entrusts its business, it exercises due care and prudence, and
gives proper instructions to collect
and remit.
The courts which support the
latter doctrine do so on the ground,
that the customer has a perfect
knowledge of the usage and ustom
of banks, that correspondents will
be selected, and impliedly authorizes the employment of a sub-agent,
and that being so selected and employed, there is a privity between
the customer and the sub-agent,
which relieves the bank first intrusted from all liability. They
likewise draw a distinction between
the case of a home and that of a
foreign bill. They admit that in
the former case the bank would be
liable for the acts and defaults of its

servants or agents to whose care
such paper is consigned for collection, yet deny that the same principles of law should govern the latter
case, and that upon the ground of
usage and knowledge and implied
authority as above stated. It is
submitted that such distinction is
not feasible and that it is contrary to
all sound principles of law. Why
should a person be made liable for
the acts of his agents or servants in
one case and not in the other? It
would seem that the foreign correspondent is as much the agent of the
bank as one of its home officers is.
In each case the bank employs
some agent or servant to transact
its business, and therefore the same
principles ought to apply in both
cases.
The question ofconsideration has
been urged as an answer to this
theory,and on this ground, namely,
that in the case of a home bill, the
bank receives the commission on
collection, while in that of a foreign one the correspondent receives
it ; thus in Titus & Scudder v.
The Mechanics' National Bank
(1871), 35 N. J. Law (6 Vroom.)
588, it was relied upon by the defendant, but the Chancellor held
the point was not well taken as
"1the consideration set forth and
proved that the plaintiffs were dealers in the bank, and kept their deposits there, and gave their checks
upon New York, by which the defendants had the advantage of the
rate of exchange, or the greater
value of funds in New York than
at Trenton is a sufficient consideration." In the case of Allen v. The
Merchants Bank of the City ofNew
York, iizfra, page 644, the same
doctrine is upheld, and in the case
of Exchange Nahonal Bank v.
Third Nalional Bank of tho City
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of Vew York, infra, page 647, the
theory is supported by the Supreme
Court of the United States. There
would therefore seem to be no reason for holding the want of consideration a defense to such an action.
The question may be looked at
from another point of view,namely,
that of an attorney at law, or a collection agency. In these cases the
law is well defined. They are liable for the acts of their correspondents to whom they transmit debts
for collection, unless, as in the case
of Bullill v. Baird (1870), 23
AmiRICAx LAw RI GISTER N. S.
546, they expressly limit their liability by their receipt: Pollardv.
Rowland (1826), 2 Blackf. (Ind.)
22 ; Bradstreetel al. v. .Eversonet
al. (1872), 72 Pa. 124. Itis difficult
to conceive why the case of a bank
should be looked at in a different
light, for its position is in all points
similar to that of an attorney and a
collection agency. They both un-,
,dertake to transact the same busimess, namely, the collection of
money due from one person to
another. That no such distinction
really does exist, is clearly pointed
out by the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice CAMPBEIj, in Third
National Bank of Louisville v.
Vicksburg Bank (I883), 6x Miss.
:112: "It seems to be well settled
that a collection agency which takes
.a claim for collection at a distant
point, is responsible for the acts of
its agent to whom the claim is sent
for collection. I am not able to
draw a distinction between a collection agency, by that name, and a
bank, which is a collection agency,
where it undertakes to collect
claims for customers ;" and by the
case of Ilooverv. Wise el al.(1876),
i

Otto, (91 U. S.) 3o8, where the

.action was brought to recover back
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a sum of money collected from the
bankrupt after the occurrence of
several acts of bankruptcy. It appeared that an account was delivered by its owners to a collecting
agency in New York, and received
by them, with instructions to collect; that they transmitted the
claim to a firm of practicing attorneys in Nebraska, who persuaded
the debtor, notwithstanding the
acts of bankruptcy, to confess judgment, which he did, and the money
was collected and remitted to the
agents in New York, but never paid
to defendants. The debtor was declared bankrupt within four months
aftersuch confession and the attorneys were aware of his condition
at the time. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the Court and
after reviewing the authorities remarked: "The cases show that
where a bank,as a collection agency,
receives a note for the purposes of
collection, its position is that of an
independent contractor, and that
the instruments employed by such
bank in the business contemplated
are its agents, and not the subagents of the owner of the note. It
is not perceived that it can make
any difference that such collection
agency is composed of individuals,
instead of being an incorporation.
These authorities go far towards establishing the position that Archer
& Co. [the collection agents] in the
case before us were independent
contractors, and that the parties
employed by them were their agents
only and not the agents of [defendants] in such manner that [defendants] are responsible for their negligence or chargeable with their
knowledge. * * We are of opinion that these authorities fix the
rule in the class of cases we are now
considering, to wit. that of attor-
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neys employed not by the creditor,
but by a collection agent who undertakes the collection of the debt.
They establish that such attorney
is the agent of the collecting agent,
and not of the creditor who employed that agent.
A distinction has been drawn by
the Courts between those cases in
which the bank receives the paper
merely for the purpose of transmission, and those in which it has received it for collection. They hold
that in the former case the fact
of receiving the documents for
transmission for collection only,
limits the responsibility to good
faith and due discretion in the
choice of an agent, while in the latter their opinions differ.
The question therefore would
seem to be one of contract, namely,
what is the real contract entered
into between the parties ? Is the
contractonly for the immediate services of the agent, and his acting
faithfully, or, does it look to the
thing to be done? If it be for the
former, then responsibility ceases
with the limits of the personal services undertaken, while if the latter, it covers all necessary and proper means for accomplishing the object, by whomsoever used or em"ployed: Allen v. The ]jerchants'
Bank of the City of New York, infra, page 644 ; Titus 6 Scudder v.
The Mechanics' National Bank,
iitfra, page 643 ; Exchange NationalBank of Pittsburgh v. Third
National Bank of the City of
New York, inzfra, page 647 ; The
Bank of Washington v. Triplett
&' Neale, infra, page 656; The
lfechanics' Bank of Phziladelphia
v. Earp, itnfra, page 654; BelleThe Bank of the
mire v.
United States, iitfra, page 654;
Wingate v. The M11echanics' Bank,

infra, page 655; and Merchants'
National Bank of Philadelphiav.
Goodman, itfra,page 656.
Notwithstanding these distinctions have been so clearly defined,
they do not seem to be fully understood or followed by the Courts 6f
some States, especially those of
Illinois. This is indicated by the
the case of The etna Insurance
Co. v. The Alton City Bank, infra,
page 650, the agreed facts of which
showed that the bill in question
was "received for collection," and
not merely for " transmission for
collection," in which light it was
treated by Justice WALXKER who referred to the cases, The Bank of
Washington v. Triplett &" Neale;
Allen v. The Merchants' Bank of
New York City, infra.
In many cases, the negligence
complained of, has been that of a
notary employed by the bank, and
the point has been successfully
taken, that for such acts, the notary
being a commissioned public officer appointed by the executive
authority of the State, the bank was
notliable. Here, again, the authorities differ, some cases drawing a
distinction where such laches were
committed by him in that part of
his office which is peculiarly official,
holding that in such case alone
would the bank be relieved from responsibility: Allen v. The ilferchants' Bank of New York City,
infra, page 644, in these words:
" If this laches had been committed
by that officer in that part of his
duty which was peculiarly official,
and could only be performed by
himself or some other notary, he
having been requested or instructed
to perform such duty, I doubt
whether the collecting bank or any
other institution or person employing him, -would be responsible for
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taken to do, whether such omission
his neglect in that which was not
or negligence betheir own or that of
voluntarily confided to him, but
others in their employ, we preserve
wherein his official duties were renthat harmony of the law which is
dered necessary by the requirements
so essential to its being understood.
of the law; and where his employer had done all that was within his by those who are to regulate theirdealings by it; and unquestionably
power for the performance of the
original undertaking.
Then it
much doubt and litigation will be
If the responsibility
would seem that the notary -would excluded.
alone be responsible."
thus imposed be onerous or inconvenient as to foreign bills, orto any
In considering this subject which
special class of transactions, it is
involves principles governing a
very easy for banks and bankers to
wide range of commercial interests,
sight must not be lost of the ques- avoid that inconvenience by stating
tion of public policy. Upon this 'the terms upon which they will receive the deposited paper."
phase ofthe question, Senator VERThe English cases establish the
PI,. :¢cK, in Allen v. Aferchants
Bank of New York, iqfra,remarks:
doctrine of principal and agent be" I cannot but think that if the law tween the parties, and hold the
of this case were now to be settled, bank liable for all acts of its subnot judicially, but legislatively,
agents:
.fackersy v. Ramsays
(1843), 9 Cl. & F. 8W8; and Van
upon considerations of public policy
Wort v. Woolley and others (1824),
alone, the docldine I have maintained * " would be found the 3 B. & C. 439; which are much relied on by the Courts in this country.
safest and wisest. If the present
In the former case it appeared that
judgment be affirmed, no small
doubt will be thrown upon the re- the defendants in the way of their
sponsibilities of collecting banks business as bankers, were employand bankers, even in domestic col- ed, for reward, by a customer with
lections, for the acts of any of their
whom they had a cash account, to
officers. As in the case of corpor- obtain payment of a bill of exate banks, or those under our gen- change drawn on a person in Caleral law, all the business is praccutta payable to their order. The
tically done by agents, that doubt
defendants employed agents, who
in turn employed others; the bill
would cover the whole of our
banking transactions. The same
was duly paid to the latter, who,
difficulty may arise in numerous
after giving their direct employers
analogous commercial affairs, the
credit for it, became bankrupt.
law as well as the usage of which
The Court held the defendants
is now settled, unless it be shaken
liable. Lord CAMIPBErL, thus statby the influence and authority of
ing the law: "The general rule
decisions and reasoning like that
of law, that an agent is liable for a
of the Supreme Court in this case.
sub-agent employed by him, is not
On the other side, if we hold colconfined to cases where the principal has reason to suppose that the
lecting banks and bankers, to be
liable for all neglect or omission of
act may be done by the agent himthe necessary and proper means for
self without employingasub-agent;
the due performance of that which
and here I conceive that the money
they have in general terms underis to be considered as received by
VoL. XXXVIIi.-4"
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Ithe agent] whose correspondents
.uctually received it, and credited
them with the amount * * before
-their failure." To Lord CO TENRAM'S mind, it was "not necessary
to go deeper than to refer to the
naxim "quifacit per allein, facil
er se," to solve the question. In
the latter case, Chief Justice AnBoTT proceeded as follows: "Upon
these facts, it is evident that the
defendants (who cannot be distinguished from, but answerable for
their London correspondents ** )
have been guilty of a neglect of
duty which they owed to the plaintiff, their employer, and from whom
they received a pecuniary reward
The plaintiff
-for their services.
is therefore entitled to maintain his
action against them, to the extent
of any damage he may have sustained by their neglect."
The Indiana courts hold the bank
liable, and follow the English cases.
in Tyson v. The State Bank of Indianz (1842), 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 225,
the bank, through one of its
branches, had undertaken to collect the plaintiff's debt, but neglected to do so, and the Court held it
liable, Justice SuLr vAN saying:
"The State Bank, through one of
its branches, having undertaken,
for a reasonable reward, to collect
the plaintiff's debt, placed itself in
the situation of an agent or attorney, who, for reward, undertakes to
,performservices for another in the
ithe line of his business or profession. He is bound -to a faithful dis,charge-of his duty, and is responsile to his employer for all damages
arising from his neglect." In The
American Express Company v.
-iaireand others (I863), 21 Ind. 4,
the bill was a foreign one, and was
handed to the company for collection. The company handed it to

the notary who failed to demand
and protest the bill at the proper
time. Here the Court followed the
New York case of Allen v. The
Merchants' Bank, infra, and held
the company liable for the acts of
its agent. The case of Tyson v.
The Slate Bank of Indiana,supra,
was cited and approved. Chapman
v. McCrea, et al. (1878), 63 Id. 639,
is to the same effect.
The law upon the question seems
to have remained unsettled in
Michigan until the case of Simnpson, v. Waldby & Clay (1886), 63
Mich. 439, came before the Supreme Court of that State. The
action was brought to recover a
balance claimed to be due from the
defendants to the plaintiff in respect
of five drafts drawn by the latter
upon a party in Vermont. The
drafts were made payable to the order of the defendants, who undertook the collection of the same,and
forwarded them to the First National Bank at St. Albans, who after
collecting, sent its own draft on
New York to defendants for the
money. It appeared that a large
number of drafts had been drawn
by and upon the same parties before, and collected in the same manner. The defendants claimed that
the amounts of the last three drafts
were never received by them owing
to the failure of the St. Albans
bank, as a draft or drafts of that
bank upon New York received by
them was protested and not paid in
New York. In the opinion Justice
'
MoRsE says: "The question is *
directly before us. Whatis thelaw
of the case when a person steps into
a bank, in the ordinary course of
business dealings, and entrusts to it
the collection of a draft drawn upon
some person residing at a distance,
in case the home bank, through the
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failure or dishonesty of another
bank, selected by itself, never receives the money upon such draft,
though the same is paid by the
drawee? In the absence of any
agreement in regard to the matter,
who must bear the loss in case the
home bank has not been at fault in
the selection of its agent or agents?
There is a conflict of authority upon
this proposition, and, as it has
never been settled in this State, we
must be guided and governed in
our action by what seems to us the
most correct view injustice and on
principle." After reviewing the
authorities, and especially the case
of Mlackersy v. JRanzsay, strta, he
continues: "the ruling in that case
squarely covers the point in issue
here. and to my mind is the better
doctrine, and most in accord with
principle.
The learned jurists
holding otherwise all admit that if
a person entrusts a home draft or
bill to a bank for collection, such
bank is responsible to the customer
for any negligence or default of its
agents, officers or employees. I cannot see why any different rule
should prevail in the collection of a
foreign bill. It is, in every case
that I have examined, sought to be
maintained upon the theory that
the customer knows the bank must
act through some other person or
persons at a distance, and therefore
impliedly from the, very nature of
the course of business, assents to
the employment of such persons
and makes them his agents. This
reasoning does not strike me as
sound. If I leave an indorsed note
against persons in my own town for
collection and consequent demand
and protest, I know that some agent
or employe of the bank will do the
work or some part of it, and I do
not know or inquire who will do it.
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I contract, however, with the bank
that suitable agents will be employed, and hold it responsible for their
acts. The law authorizes me to do
this. If I entrust the same bank
with the collection of a foreign
draft, I also know that they will
employ some agent or correspondent abroad of their selection, not
mine, ofwhom I know nothing and
with whom they are supposed to
have business relations. I do not
inquire whom they are to select. I
presume, and have a right to presume, that they have business knowledge of such agent or agents, which
I do not and cannot possess, by the
very course of their dealings as
bankers. In each case, the bank
holds itself out for a consideration
to collect my paper, and it can
make no difference whether the
compensation is great or small. In
each case, it selects its own agents
in the premises. In each case, I
have no part in or control oversuch
selection. In each case, there is no
privity between the party selected
and myself. I fail to perceive why
in the one case more than the other
I adopt the immediate party collecting or protesting the bill as my
agent. I cannot find any good reason for making this particular case
of the collection of a foreign bill, an
exemption to the general rule of
agency.))
The NewJersey decisions follow
those of New York. In Titus &
Scudder v. The Mfechanics' NalionalBank (1871), 35 N. J. Law
(6 Vroom) 588, after duly considering the previous cases upon the
question pro and con, the Chancellor expressed himself thus : "In
this conflict of authorities, the
weight of mere numbers ought not
to govern. We should rather look
for authority to those courts which
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usually decide upon principles acknowledged by the courts of this
State, and by whose decisions we
are accustomed to be guided. The
courts of England are the sources
from which we derive our legal
maxims, and those of New York
have adhered more closely to the
rules of the common law which are
our guide, than courts of other
States.
But this consideration
alone is not sufficient to determine
a question like this; -we must look
to the principles adopted by us
which control it. One cardinal and
well-established prihciple is, that
every one shall be liable for the
acts of his agents chosen by himself. This, when applied to such
a case is founded in equity and
good sense. A dealer who deposits
a draft on a distant city, in a bank
in his own town, has no choice of
their agent or correspondent. It is
the business of a bank to provide
proper agents or correspondents
for this service, when they adopt
it, as most banks do, as part of their
regular business."
In New York the matter has
been very much debated upon, but
seems to be settled in favor of the
liability of the bank for the acts of
its correspondent. In the case of
Allen v. The Merchants' Bank of
the City of New York (1839), 22
Wend. (N. Y.) 215, the bench was
composed of the Chancellor and
twenty-three Senators, who were
divided in opinion, fourteen being
in favor of the liability of the bank
and ten against it, the Chancellor
being one of the minority. The
case had been decided in the Supreme Court of that State and verdict given in favor of the bank in
1836, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 482, and
the plaintiff appealed. The decision was reversed, Senator* VER-

PLANCE, putting the case as fol-

lows: "A bill ofExchange drawn
in New York upon a person resident in Philadelphia. is deposited
for collection in a New York bank,
is received for that purpose, and
duly transmitted to their correspondent and agent, a Philadelphia
bank, the notary of which is guilty
of a neglect, whereby on refusal to
accept at Philadelphia, payment
from the New York drawer or endorser is lost. Is the New York
bank first receiving this paper for
collection, responsible for the loss
or damage arising from the default
of its Philadelphia agent? It is
well settled in this State that there
is an implied undertaking by a
bank or banker receiving negotiable
paper deposited for collection, to
take the necessary measures to
charge the drawer, maker or other
parties, upon the default or refusal
to pay or accept. The ground of
this rule is, that the acceptance of
negotiable paper thus deposited for
collection forms an" implied undertaking to make the demands and
giv6 the notices required by law
or mercantile usage for the perfect
protection of the holder's rights
against all previous parties, for
which undertaking the use of the
funds thus temporarily obtained
or of the average balances thereof,
for the purposes of discount or exchange, forms a valuable consideration. Had we no express authority
on this head, I should consider the
acceptance by a bank of paper for
collection from a customer, in the
usual course of his business, as sufficient evidence of a valuable consideration. The whole ordinary
business of a bank with its dealers,
is one of mutual profit or accommodation, and must be taken together
(unless some part is separated by
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express understanding) and it is
not for a bank to allege or for a
Court to consider * * that a collection in a particular place must
be regarded as a gratuitous favor.
If accepted at all, the general profits
and advantages of the business, of
which this may perhaps be an unproductive part, form a good consideration for the undertaking.
This, however, is not an open question, after the decision of this Court
in the two cases against the Bank
of Utica."
[Smedes v. Bank of
Utica (1823), 20 Johns. (N. Y.)372;
S. C. (1824), 3 Cowen (N. Y.) 662;
and .3cKinster v. Bank of Utica
(1832), 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 473.] He
points out the wide difference existing, as well by positive law asby
reason of the thing itself, between
a contract or undertaking to do a
thing, and the delegation of an
agent or attorney to procure the
doing the same thing, the contractor being bound to answer for any
negligence or default in the performance of his contract, although
such negligence or default be not
his own, while the mere representative agent, discharges his whole
duty if he acts with good faith and
ordinary diligence in the selection
of his materials, the forming of his
contracts and the choice of his
workman, and continues thus:
"INow in the case of the deposit
for collection of a domestic note or
bill payable in the same town, no
one can imagine that this, instead
of being a contract with the bank
to use the paper, is a mere delegation of power to act as an attorney
for that purpose. If this were so,
and it should happen that by the
fraud, the carelessness, or the ig-'
norance of a clerk or teller, the only
responsible parties were discharged,
or the note itself lost or destroyed,
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it would be a sufficient defense for
the bank if it could show that the
directors had employed ordinary
care and caution in selecting their
officers; or any similar defense
which would be good in the mouth
of an attorney in fact, or a steward
acting in good faith for his principal, who had been defrauded in any
transaction. * * The natural and
general understanding of men of
business is *
that of an implied
agreement with the bank itself, of
whose officers and agents they have
no knowledge, and with whom they
have no privity of contract * * Is
there anything in the mere fact of
the paper being payable in another
city: and therefore requiring the
aid of other agents, sufficient to
take that case out of the general
rule? In the deposit of a note for
collection, payable in the same
place, the holder is equally aware
that the bank cannot personally attend to the collection, and its
management must be left to some
one or more competent agents.
But he makes an implied contract
with the bank that the proper and
expedient means shall be used to
collect his note. So he does as to
a foreign debt; and in each case he
alike presumes that proper agents
will be employed. In neither case
has he any knowledge ofthe agents
or privity with them. I can perceive no reason for liability or exemption from liability in either
case which does not equally apply
to the other." He draws a distinction between cases where the bank
receives the paper merely for transmission to its correspondents and
cases in which it receives for collection, saying: "The bank, if its
officers think fit, and the dealer
will consent, may vary that liability in either case. It may receive
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The State Bank of Ohio (1858), 8
the paper only for transmission to
Ohio St. 465, being the leading
That would
its correspondents.
case. In it, Justice BRINKERHOFF
form a new and different contract,
considers the opinions in the New
and would limit the responsibility
to good faith and due discretion in York case of Allez v. The Merchants' Bank of NAew York, su15ra,
the choice of an agent. But if this
very fully and upholds the decision
be not done, or unless there be
in that case: " On the whole looksome implied understanding on the
ing at the question in the light of
subject, I see no difference between
the responsibility assumed in the principle,and of whatseems to us to
undertaking to collect foreign bills, be a sound legal policy, we prefer to
adopt the doctrine of the Courts of
and that for collecting domestic
paper, payable at home. It is as- England and New York, as now essumed in the same manner, in the tablished."
The rule in South Carolinawould
same words and in the same conseem to follow that of New York,
sideration."
The proper construction to be for in the case of Thompson v. Tze
put upon all questions of this kind Bank of the State of South Carois expressed by the same learned lina (1836), 3 Hill (S. C.) 77, where
"In all the plaintiff deposited a note, enJudge in these words:
dorsed to him by the payee in the
these cases, we are not to look to
the necessity of the employment of
branch bank at Camden for collecWe are
distant or under agents.
tion. At maturity, it was not paid
to look to the contract itself. Leg- and was protested for non-payment
by the bank notary, but no notice
em enim contraclus dat. We are
to look whether the contract be was given to the indorser or to the
only for the immediate services of plaintiff who brought action, for the
non-performance by the bank of its.
the agent, and his acting faithfully
as ,the representative of his princi- undertaking to collect, and to give
notice to charge the indorser. In.
pal, doing for him, in the business
delivering the opinion of the Court,
confided to his care, what the prinby which the bank was held liable,
cipal is not able or willing to do for
himself, or whether the contract Justice EAir.B said, " Whosoever
undertakes an agency, engages likelooks mainly to the thing itself to
wise to employ an adequate degree
be done, and the undertaking be
of skill, and to -use a reasonable defor the due use of all the proper
gree of diligence. In this case, the
means for its performance. In the
bank engaged for the exercise of so
one case, the responsibility ceases
much skill, in the particular part
with the limits of the personal serof business, as to perform the duty
vices undertaken ; in the other, it
of collecting the note; and * *
extends to cover all the necessary
and proper means for the accom-" of doing whatever was necessary to
charge those to whom the plaintiff
plishment of the object, by whommight resort for payment; and * *
soever used or employed.'
The
case of Ayrault v. The Pacific that it would omit nothing which
reasonable diligence would enable
Bank (I872), 47 N. Y. 570, is to the
it to perform."
same effect.
The rule as established by the
The same doctrine prevails in
preceding decisions, is supported by
Chio, Reeves, Stephens & Co. v.
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those of the Supreme Court of the
United States. In Exchange National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Third
Ndtional Bank of the City of New
York (1884), 112 U. S. 276, the action was brought to recover damages for the alleged negligence of
the defendant in regard to eleven
drafts or bills of exchange, endorsed
by the plaintiff to the defendant for
collection. The facts showed that
the drafts were drawn at Pittsburgh,
to the order of one Baldwin and by
him endorsed, on a company in
New Jersey; that they were discounted before acceptance, by the
plaintiff for the drawers; that they
were transmitted for collection, before maturity by the plaintiff to the
defendant; that they were sent by
the defendant to its correspondent,
the First National Bank of Newark; that the drafts were presented ; that they were addressed to
"Walter M. Conger, Sec'y Newark
Tea Tray Co., Newark, N. J."; that
the acceptance was made by Conger
in his own name, as follows: "Accepted, payable at the Newark National Banking Co. Walter M. Conger," that when the acceptance was
taken, the time of payment was so
far distant that there was sufficient
time to communicate to the plaintiff the form of the acceptance, and
jor the plaintiff thereafter to give
further instructions as to the form
of acceptance ; that the Newark
bank held the drafts for payment,
but the plaintiff was not advised of
the form of acceptance until some
time afterwards, and two of them
were returned to it by the defendant, the drawers and endorsers being then insolvent. The negligence
alleged was the not obtaining acceptance of the drafts by the company, orhaving them protested for
non-acceptance by it, or giving no-
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tice to the plaintiff of such non-acceptance, and in failing to give notice that the company would not
accept, or that Conger would not
accept them in his official capacity.
The elaborate opinion of the Court,
examining all the previous decisions both in this country and ir
]England, was delivered by Justice
BLATCHFORD: "The question involves a rule of law of general application. Whatever be the proper
rule, it is one of commercial law.
It concerns trade between different
and distant places and in the absence of statutory regulations or
special contract or usage having the
force of law, it is not to be determined according to the views or interests of any particular individuals,
classes or localities, but according
to those principles which will promote the general welfare of the
commercial community.
Especially is this so when the question is
presented to this tribunal, whose
decisions are controlling in all cases
in the Federal Courts.
"The agreement of the defendant
in this case was to collect the drafts,
not merely to transmit them to the
Newark Bank for collection. Thi
distinction is manifest; and the
question presented is, whether the
Newark Bank, first receiving these
drafts for collection isresponsible for
the loss or damage resulting from the
default of its Newark agent. There
is no statute or usage or special contract in this case, to qualify or vary
the obligation resulting from the
deposit of the drafts with the New
York Bank for collection. On its
receipt of the drafts, under these
circumstances, an implied undertaking by it arose, to take all necessary measures to make the demands of acceptance necessary to'
protect the rights of the holdler
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against previous parties to the
paper. From the facts found, it is
to be inferred that the New York
Bank took the drafts from the plaintiff, h.§ a customer, in the usual
course of business. * * The taking
by a bank, from a customer, in the
-usual course of business, of paper
for collection, is sufficient evidence
of a valuable consideration for the
service. The general profits of the
receiving bank from the business
between the parties and the accommodation to the customer, must all
be considered together, and form a
consideration, in the absence of any
controlling facts to the contrary, so
that the collection of the paper cannot be regarded as a gratuitous
favor. The contract then, becomes
one to perform certain duties necessary for the collection of the paperand the protection of the holder.
The bank is not merely appointed
an attorney, authorized to select
other agents to collect the paper.
Its undertaking is to do the thing
and not merely to procure it to be
done. In such case, the bank is
held to agree to answer for any default in the performance of the contract; and whether the paper is to
be collected in the place where the
'bank is situated, or at a distance,
the contractis to use the proper
means to collect the paper, and the
-bank, by employing sub-agents to
perform a part of what it has contracted to do, becomes responsible
to its customer. This general principle applies to all who contract to
perform a service."
Continuing,
he adds: "The distinction between
the liability of one who contracts
to do a thing and that of one who,
-merely receives a delegation of
authority to act for another is a fundamental one, applicable to the
present case. If the agency is an

undertaking to do the business, the
original principal may look to the
immediate contractor with himself
and is not obliged to look to inferior or distant under contractors or
%ub-agents, when default occurs
injurious to his interest." Alluding to the means whereby a bank
may relieve itself of this responsibility the same learned judge says:
"Whether a draft is payable in the
place where the bank receiving it
for collection is situated, or in
another place, the holder is aware
that the collection must be made by
a competent agent. In either case,
there is an implied contract of the
bank that the proper measures shall
be used to collect the draft, and a
right, on the part of its owner, that
proper agents will be employed, he
having no knowledge of the agents.
There is, therefore, no reason for
liability or exemption from liability
in the one case which does not apply to the other. And while the
rule of law is thus general, the liability of the bank may be varied
by consent, or the bank may refuse
to undertake the collection. It may
agree to receive the paper only for
transmission to its correspondent
and thus make a different contract
and become responsible only for
good faith and due discretion in the
choice of an agent. If this is not,
done or there is no implied understanding to that effect, the same
responsibility is assumed in the undertaking to collect foreign paper
and in that to collect paper payable
at home. On any other rule, no
principal contractor would be liable
for the default of his own agent,
where, from the nature of the business it was evident he must employ
sub-agents. The distinction recurs
between the rule of merely personal
representative agency and the re-
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sponsibility imposed by the law of
commercial contracts. This solves
the difficulty and reconciles the apparent conflict of decision in many
cases. The nature of the contract
is the test. If the contract be only
for the immediate services of the
agent and for his faithful conduct
as representing his principal, the
responsibility ceases with the limit
of the personal service undertaken.
But where the contract looks mainly
to the things to be done, and the
undertaking is for the due use of all
proper means to performanqe, the
responsibility extends to all necessary and proper means to accomplish the object, by whomsoever
used." ,
In the case of East Haddam
Bank v. Scovil (1837), 12 Conn.
302, a bill was drawn in Great Britain in favor of the defendant, upon
merchants in New York, accepted
by them, and subsequently endorsed
by the defendant and one Ingham
for the purpose of being transmitted
to the plaintiff bank for collection,
the sole interest being in the defendant, the endorsement by Ingham being merely for the purpose of accommodation. The plaintiff bank
enclosed the bill with others and
sent them to the Merchants' ]Exchange Bank of New York for collection. At maturity the bill was
presented for payment, and being
dishonored was protested, and due
notice thereof given to the drawer,
but none to the plaintiff, defendant
or Ingham. Plaintiff subsequently
credited the amount to Ingham,
who drew his check in favor of defendant, which plaintiff honored.
The acceptors of the bill were insolvent before the bill became due,
and the plaintiff claimed the money
as money paid under a mistake
and misapprehension of facts, that
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it had not been guilty of negligence
or default of duty ; that it was not
by law bound or obliged to give any
other notice to the defendant of the
non-payment of the bill than that
given; that if any other notice was
by law necessary, the defendant had
received it; that the Merchants'
Exchange Bank was not the agent
of the plaintiff in respect of this
bill; and that the plaintiff was not
liable for any default or negligence
of that bank in regard to it, if any
such default or negligence existed,
which it denied: Justice HUNTnZGTON in delivering the opinion of the
Court in support of the theory that
the Merchants' Exchange Bank was
not the agent of the plaintiff, upon
the ground that it was necessary to
transmit to a reputable correspondent according to the usual course
of business for collection, and that
such facts were known to the defendant, remarks: " It cannot justly be claimed, that the plaintiffs
should have become insurers against
the defaults of their correspondents.
Such a doctrine would be as inequitable, as it might be oppressive and
ruinous to banks who are merely
the medium through which the
holders of bills and drafts payable
in other States transmit them for
collection. If they act in good
faith in the selection of an agentto
protect the interests of the holder
of the bill, in cases where it is obvious an agent must be selected for
such purpose, what principle ofjustice or commercial policy requires,
that they should be held liable for
any neglect of duty on the part
of such agent? * * - The mode
now adopted and in general use, is
well calculated to insure collections
with promptitude, at a trifling expense, and without trouble to the
holder. It is highly reasonable he
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should assume the risk of the defaults of the collecting agent, rather
than the bank, who merely transmit
the bill, and select the agent, with
the consent of the holder, and with
a perfect knowledge on his part
thatsuch selections must be made."
"The general duty of an agent
who receives for collection a bill of
exchange," says the Court in M17erchants' & Manufacturers'Bank v.
Stafford Bank (I877), 44 Conn. 564,
"I is to use due diligence in presenting the same for acceptance. and in
presenting it for payment, if it has
been accepted, and to give the
holder and other parties to the
paper, by the next day's post, the
notices of dishonor required by law
in case acceptance or payment is
refused, and to give to his principal
any special notice which is required
by the terms of the instructions to
the agent, or of the contract which
the agent has entered into with his
principal. The agent is also required to protest, in case of non-acceptance or non-payment, if protest
is not forbidden, and to send the
protest to the holder."
To this may be added, the remark of Justice ]EX.LSWORTH in
The Bridgeport Bank v. Dyer
(1848), i9 Conn. 136: "No principle of law is better settled than
that a known practice, or one belonging to a particular branch of
business is sufficient evidence of
the understanding of the parties,
when contracting in relation to that
business, unless there be evidence
to the contrary."
In the case of Thze .,tna
Insurance Compiany v. Tie Alton City
Bank (I86I), 25 Ill. 221, although
the facts as agreed upon between
'the parties clearly showed that the
bill in question was received for
collection, Justice WAIKXR treated

it as if received for transmission
for collection, and held the bank
not liable for the acts of its correspondents.
"When received for
transmission, it [the bank] has
fully discharged its duty by sending
the instrument in due season to a
competent reliable agent with proper instructions for its collection.
This is manifestly the rule clearly
announced in a large majority of
the adjudged cases." This statement of the law is no doubt true
where the bank receives the paper
for transmission for collection, but
not where, as the agreed facts in
this case show, such paper is received for collection. The distinction is shown by the cases of The
Bank of Washington v. Tripilelt
&' Neale, infra; Allen v.
The
Merchants' Bank of New York
City, supra; and Jackson v. The
Union Bank, infra; all of which
are cited and referred to in the opinion. There is no doubt, however,
that the learned Judge treated the
bill as received for transmission,
contrary to the facts, for in the last
paragraph of the opinion he continues: "In this case it appears
that the defendants received the
bill in controversy for transmission
for collection, and in due season
forwarded it to their correspondents
at the residence of the drawees.
That they were competent and reliable, and that defendants in no
way contributed to any loss that
may have occurred. If, then, any
liability has been incurred to the
plaintiffs, it is by the St. Louis
house, who became their agents,
and not by the defendants." It
may be difficult to define what
amounts to a receipt for collection,
and what is a receipt for transmission for collection, but still when
the facts of the case absolutely
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show that the document in question was received for collection there
can be no reason for holding it as
received for transmission only.
The case of Pay & Co. v. Strawn
(1863), 32 l. 295, was one wherein
the appellants were bankers, who
had received from appellee a draft
payable to appellants for collection,
which they in turn had endorsed
over to their correspondents, who
failed three days after collecting the
money without having remitted it
to the appellants. The appellants
were adjudged not liable, but it
would seem solely on account of a
special contract, for from the opinion it is gathered, that when first
applied to, they positively refused
to undertake the collection of the
draft; when they were applied to a
second time, they only agreed to
send the draft forward, upon the
condition that they were to incur
no liability, and that the correspondents were to transmit the collection to the appellants by expres-.
The Iowa cases maintain the
theory, that "The bank receiving
the paper becomes an agent of the
depositor with authority to employ
another bank to collect it.
The
second bank becomes the subagent of the customer of the first,
for the reason that the customer
authorizes the employment of such
an agent to make the collection.
The paper remains the property
of the customer, and is collected
for him; the party employed
with his assent, to make the collection, must therefore be regarded
as his agent. A sub-agent is accountable ordinarily only to his superioragentwhen employed without
the assent or direction of the principal. But if he be employed with
the express or implied assent of the
principal, the superior agent will
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not be responsible for his acts.
There is in such a case, a privity between the sub-agent and the principal, who must, therefore, seek a
remedy directly against the subagent for his negligence or misconduct. These familiar rules of the
law applied to the case, relieve it of
all doubt when considered in the
light of legal principles." BECK,
J., Gueliclh v. The National State
Bank of Burlingtoit (1881), 56
Iowa, 434.
In Hyde& Goodrick v. Planters'
Bank (1841), 7 La. 56o, the action
was brought to recover damages occasioned through the negligence of
a notay, but the Court held it
would not lie, as "to make the defendants responsible for his neglect
of official duty on the part of the
notary, would be rendering them
the sureties of the officer; it would
be changing the ground upon
which alone they can be held liable,
to-wit: that of negligence in the
discharge of their duty to their
principals."
This is followed in
Baldwin v. 7he Bank of Louiiana
(1846), I La. Ann. 13.
In Maryland, the law would
seem to be against the liability of
the bank. In Jackson v. 7e Union Bank of Afaryland (i823), 6
liar. & J. (Ald.) 146, the plaintiff'
charged the defendant with negligence with reference to a bill of exchange drawn by the plaintiff upon
a party in Washington, D. C., and
placed in defendants' hands for collection. The bill was a foreign one
and was forwarded by defendants to
their agents in Washington. The
demands for payment and protest
were made on the fourth day according to the custom of the banks
in the District. In the opinion of
the Court, which discharges the defendants, Justice BucuANAx dwells
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upon the custom of the defendants
to collect paper for their customers
through the agency of other banks ;
also upon the fact that the plaintiff
was a customer, "and must be supposed to have had a knowledge of
the uniform and established mode
of making such cohections by the
banks," further, he takes the point
that "the placing" of the bill
"with the defendants for collection
was equivalent to an agreement that
it should be sent by them for that
purpose to some bank in the District of Columbia, * * their established agent, * * and if that agent
,did, in conformity with the custom
* * neglect to cause demand and
protest to be made on the proper
day, the defendants are not chargeable with any negligence, or other
iSimilarly,
improper conduct."
Citizens' Bank of Ballimnore v.
I-lowell &' Brothers (1855), 8 Md.
.530.
In Fabens v. The Mercantile
Bank (1840), 23 Cush. (Mass.) 330,
it was agreed, that the usage of the
banks in Massachusetts, was to collect notes, the makers of which resided without the State, through
some bank in the place of the
maker's residence, if there were
.any bank in such place in good
standing, and to transmit the notes
to such bank for that purpose. A
notice had always been posted up
in the bank in question, "that the
cashier may receive notes and bills
of exchange for collection, for
which neither the bank, nor any
officer thereof shall be held accountable for any irregularity in notifying." -Here Chief justice SHAvw
said: "We think this question must
depend upon the usage and custom
of merchants and bankers, and the
implied obligation upon the latter,
resulting from their relations, as

no special contract was made, and
no special instruction given in the
present case. We think it very
clear upon principle and authority
that by a general usage, now so well
understood as safely to be considered a rule of law, when a bank receives a note for collection, it is
bound to use reasonable skill and
diligence in making the collection,
and for this purpose is bound to
make a reasonable demand on the
promisor and in case of dishonor,
to give due notice to the indorsers,
so that the security of the holder
shall not be lost or essentially impaired by the discharge of indorsers. * * But it is equally well
settled, that when a note is deposited with a bank for collection,
which is payable at another place,
the whole duty of the bank so receiving the note in the first instance, is seasonably to transmit
the same to a suitable bank or other
agent at the place of payment.
.And as part of the same doctrine,
it is well settled, that if the acceptor of a bill or promisor of a
note, has his residence in another
place it shall be presumed to have
been intended and understood between the depositor for collection
and the bank, that it was to be transmitted to the place of residence
of the promisor, and the same rule
shall then apply, as if on the face
of the note it was payable at that
place. * * We are therefore of
opinion, that the defendants had
performed their duty, when they
transmitted the note to a solvent
bank in good standing, and were
not responsible for the misfeasance
or negligence of that bank."
The case of The Dorchesler and
lAfilton Bank v. The New England
Bank (1848), x Cush. (Mass.) 77,
supports these principles. In that
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case, it was contended by plaintiff's
counsel that the defendant bank
had no right to place the bills,
which had been placed in its hands
for collection, in the hands of another bank (the bills were payable
at Washington and the defendants
had no correspondents there), on
the ground that an agent has' no
authority to delegate his authority
to a sub-agent without the assent
of his principal. This contention
was, however, denied by justice
WILDE: "This, no doubt, is generally true, but when from the nature of the agency, a sub-agent or
sub-agents must necessarily be employed, the assent of the principal
is implied. * * If the defendants employed suitable sub-agents
for that purpose, in good faith, they
are not liable for the neglect or default of the sub-agents. * * The
defendant's liability was limited to good faith and due discretion
in the choice of an agent to transmit the bills, and to procure a remittance of the money when paid.
* * The usage of a bank is binding on all persons dealing with the
bank, whether they know of the
usage or not."
The Courts in Afississipi hold
that in the case of a receipt for collection, the bank is not liable:
Tiernayt et al. v. Commercial Bank
of Natchez (1843), 7 How. (Miss.)
648, where a notary had been negligent in collecting a domestic bill;
The AgriculturalBank of Afississippi v. The Commercial Bank of
171anchester (1846), 7 S and Al.
(Miss.) 592, a case of a foreign bill;
Bowlingv. Artnur (I85 7 ), 34 Miss.
41, where it was held that the notary was liable directly to the
payee. In Third National Bank
of Louisville v. Vicksburg Bank
(iS8 3 ) 6T Miss. i2, justice COOPER
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followed the ruling in the previous
cases, while Chief justice CAMPBErL delivered a dissenting opinion: "I think the rule which prevails in England, and New York,
New Jersey, and Ohio, and which
is preferred by several eminent text
writers, is the true one, and that a
bank taking paper for collection is
responsible for the default of its
correspondent. I do not find fault
with the cases cited from our own
reports. They were where the claim
was handed to a notary, and it was
properly held that he was the agent,
not of the bank, but of ,the owner
of the paper, and that the bank was
not responsible for the default of
the notary. Where protest becomes
necessary or proper, the paper
must be handed to a notary, and
the owner of the claim knows that,
and is conclusively presumed to
have authorized the bank to commit the paper to a notary if it
should become necessary to protest
it. "-'* * To this I agree, but I
am unable to assent to the doctrine
that a bank is not responsible for
its own agents in the conduct of its
regular business. It seems to be
settled that a collection agency
which takes a claim for collection
at a distant-point is responsible for
the acts of its agent to whom the
claim is sent for collection. I am
not able to draw a distinction between a collection agency, by that
name, and a bank, which is a col
lection agency, where it undertakes
to collect claims for customers."
In the case of CapitolSlate Bank
v. Lane (1876), 52 Miss. 677, the
draft was a foreign one and was not
protested, and the Court held the
bank liable, saying: "As a legal
proposition, it is undeniably true
that a bank which receives a note or
bill for collection is bound 0 use
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due and proper diligence in making
demand and giving notice and
causingprotest to be made, so as to
hold all parties liable, and in default of such diligence, the bank itself becomes responsible to the
party who deposited the note or
bill."
The decisions in the State of Nissouri also uphold the doctrine
"that where the bank with which
the bill or draft is placed or deposited for collection, uses due diligence and transmits the paper to a
proper correspondent for collection,
with proper instructions for the
collection of the same, its responsibility is at an end, unless by some
after act it makes itselfresponsible:
Daly v. Butchers' and Drovers'
Bank (1874), 56 Mo. 94. In this
case, that of Gerhard? v. The
Boatman's Saving Institution
(1866), 38 Mo. 6o, was much commented upon by the Court. It was
a case where the defendants with
whom the plaintiff kept his regular
deposit account, had delivered to it
negotiable promissory notes for collection. The defendant employed
a notary to do all its notarial
business, and had required him to
to give a bond, and appointed him
by the year. The action lay for his
negligence in not giving notice of
dishonor, whereby the endorser was
discharged, and the Court held the
defendant liable for his acts, stating that it "having appointed
the notary by the year, and required
a bond for the faithful performance
of his duties, made him its agent
and an officer of the bank," and
cited in support of its opinion the
passage from Story on Agency.
452, sup ra. At the same time the
Court said: "If the subject of the
controversy were a foreign bill of

exchange, it might present an entirely different aspect."
One of the earliest cases in Pennsylvania upon the question is The
Mechanics' Bank of Philadeifihiav.
EarP (1834), 4 Rawle (Pa.) 384;
here the defendant drew upon parties in Virginia, and presented the
bills to the bank to be transmitted
for collection. The bills were not
paid, and the bank refused to permit defendantto transfer his stock.
In delivering the opinion of the
Court, Justice ROGERS points out
the distinction between the case of
paper received for transmission for
collection, and simply for collection: "If the undertaking of the
bank was to collect, and not merely
to transmit,they would be answerable for their Virginia correspondent; and this I understand to be
the principle of the case of Van
Wait v. Woolley, [supra] * * If
the jury should be of opinion, that
the Mechanics Bank undertook to
collect the money, then it will be
necessary to inquire, whether the
bank of Virginia has done its duty,
and what is the extent of the liability of the defendants. * * The
bank would be liable in damages
only as any other agent to his principal, to the extent of the damage
which may have been sustained by
their neglect."
The next case
which occupied the attention of the
Court in that State, was that of a
home bill or note: Bellemire v.
The Bank of the United States
(1838), 4 Whar. (Pa.) io5, wherein
Chief Justice GrBsoNx expressed the
rule as follows: "Ithas been ruled
by this Court * * that a bank employed to transmit for collection, is
bound to concern itself with the
act of transmission alone ; and that
its correspondent becomes the
agent for subsequent measures. It
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is suggested, however, that a bank
which has undertaken the whole
business of collection, may be affected by other considerations ; but
though it be the holder by endorsement, there is nothing peculiar in
its position. It is invested with the
apparent ownership only to authorize it to present for payment; and
standing in all other respects on the
ordinary footing of an agent, it is
sufficient to exonerate it that it
has acted in good faith, and, though
not to the best advantage, according to the regular and accustomed
course of the business. * * A bank
is compelled by the incorporeal
nature of its essence, to act by the
instrumentality of agents; and
when it employs its own servant
with the usual instructions, it performs its,implied promise to use ordinary diligence. * * It performed its undertaking when, for
the purposes of presentation and
notice, it put it into the hands of its
In this case the
own notary."
Chief Justice took the view that the
bank acted gratuitously, and according to the usual practice, and that
there was no recourse. This was
followed by the case of Wingate v.
fflechanics' Bank (848), 1o Pa. 105,
it which the action was for damages for undertaking to collect a foreign bill for a valuable consideration. In this case, it appeared that
the bank had put up in its premises
placards, and also distributed them
to its customers, offering to collect
drafts on certain points for seven
per cent. The notes were not collected and no notice was given.
Justice COULTIER in delivering the
opinion of the Court dwells upon
the difference between a drafthanded to a bank for collection and one
handed to it for transmission for collection: "Was the contract to col-
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lect the notes by the defendants for
seven per cent., established ; and
if so, were they guilty of such negligence, under that contract, as to
make them liable to the plaintiffs
for the loss incurred in consequence
of it? * * The law is clear, that
if an agent undertake to do a specified thing for a stipulated reward,
he is bound to exercise due diligence to accomplish what he has
agreed to do ; and to observe good
faith towards his principal in every
step, either of success or failure, towards accomplishing the end. The
law implies a promise from brokers,
bankers, or agents, and attorneys,
that they will severally, in their respective callings, exercise competent skill and proper care in the service they undertake to perform; in
which if they fail, an action lies to
recover damages for the breach of
their implied promise. * * If
the contract or agreement by defendants was not to collect the
notes deposited, but merely an engagement to transmit them to a
responsible person, * * the defendants were not liable, because
they had committed them to a bank
in good credit." With regard to
the question of the obligation to
give notice he referred to Story on
Agency, 2o8, where it is laid down
that, "it is the duty of agents to
keep their principals advised of
their doings, and to give them notice in a reasonable time of all such
facts and circumstances as may be
important to their interests," and
continuing, observed: "In the exercise ofgood faith to his principal,
the agent ought to be held to the
giving such notice, whether the
agent be an individual or a bank ;
for banks are subject to the settled
law of contracts, as well as individuals."
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The still more recentcase of AIerchants' National Bank of Philadelphia v. Goodman (1885), io9
Pa. 422, shows that, "The agreement to transmit for collection
is a contract between the bank
and its customer; the valuable
consideration which supports the
agreement as a contract, is the use
of the money to be collected by
the bank so long as it shall be allowed to remain in their hands after
it has been collected. This binds
the collecting bank to do all that is
incumbent on them to do ; and that
entire duty, * * is discharged when
the check or draft is transmitted to
a responsible sub-agent to collect
the money. The agent to whom
the instrument is sent to make demand for payment, then becomes
the agent of the depositor or endorser, and is liable to such depositor for loss arising from failure on
his part to perform the duty which
is incident to an undertaking to collect the money; and such duty is
not discharged when anything but
money is accepted as payment, in
the absence of special authority to
the contrary." This was the opinion of the Court below and was affirmed as above, Chief Justice MERCUR dissenting. The case of Lee v.
The FirstNational Bank of West
Chester (i88o), i Chest. Cnty. Rep.
(Pa.) 1o9, is to the same effect.
In Tennessee, the case of Bank of
Louisvillev. FirslNationalBank of
Knoxville (1874), 8 Bax. (Tenn.)
IOI, supports the ruling mn favor
of the exemption of the bank from
liability. The action was brought
against the bank and Brown, a notary public, to recover damages for
their failure to protest a bill of exchange sent by plaintiff to defendant. Here the Court said: "All
that is required is, that the bank re-

ceiving such bill in the first place,
should act in good faith in the selection of a proper agent to protect
the interests of the holder of the
bill." The Circuit Court, in accordance with the New York case of
Allen v. The 1Merchants' Bank,
situra,had held the bank liable, and
was reversed.
The Wisconsin courts also follow
this doctrine, in the case of a note
payable by a party residing at a distance from the bank's place of business, that the contract is not absolutely to make due presentment
and give due notice, but to place the
note in the hands of some competent and responsible agent doing
business at the residence of the
maker, and that having done this,
it is itself discharged from liability.
The case of Stacy and another v.
The Dane County Bank (f86o), iz
Wis. 629, shows that in such cases.
"there is an implied authority to
employ a sub-agent, and that if the
bank exercises reasonable care and
skill in selecting one, it is not afterwards liable for his default." This
case supports a theory that if the
note was in due season -delivered to
a notary public at the residence of
the maker, for presentment and protest, such fact would constitute a
good defense upon the ground
"that those officers are appointed
by public authority, and that therefore, at least in the absence of any
direct notice to the contrary, parties
have a right to assume that they are
fit and proper agents to discharge
the duties of their office."
In some cases, the bank actually
making the collection, has been held
to assume the entire agency, and to
relieve the principal from liability,
thus in The Bank of Washington v.
Triblelt & Neale (1828), x Peter
(26 U. S.) 25, the ba-ik contended
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that it was not the agent of the
plaintiffs, but of the Alexandria
Bank, from whom it received the
bill, and that where an agent, employed to transact aparticular business, engages another person to do
it, the latter is not responsible to
the principal. This was denied by
the Court, as the bill was not delivered to the Alexandria Bank for collection, but for transmission, and
the Alexandria Bank by transmitting as directed performed its duty,
and the whole responsibility of collection devolved on the defendant
bank. Chief Justice MARSHALL,
who delivered the opinion, said:" the deposit of a bill in one bank
to be transmitted for collection to
another is a common usage of great
public convenience, the effect of
which is well understood. * * The
letter of [the Alexandria Bank] dis,closed the real party entitled to the
money, and the answer to that
letter assumes the agency, if it had
not been previously assumed. The
Court is decidedly of opinion that the
Bank of Washington, by receiving
the bill for collection, and certainly,
by its letter, * * became the agent
of Triplett and Neale, and assumed
the responsibility attached to that
character."
It is submitted that the liability
of a bank which has undertaken to
collect commercial paper, either
domestic or foreign, cannot differ
from that of any other party who
has contracted to do a specified
thing; for the law is well settled
that if a person promises or undertakes to perform a certain act, he is
liable for all defaults and negli-
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gences, even though his action
be gratuitous: Coggs v. Bernard
(1704), 2 Ld.Raym. 9o9; therefore,
if the paper has been placed in the
hands of the bank for collection, in
the absence of any express contract
to the contrary, it is properly made
liable for the acts of its agents and
correspondents. There is in such
case an implied contract co-ordinate and commensurate with duty,
dictated by reason and justice; for,
whenever it is certain that a man
ought to do a particular thing, the
law supposes him to have promised
to do that thing: Illinois Central
RR. Co. v. U. S. (I88o), x6 Ct. Cl.
333-"
Upon this theory, which it is
contended is the true one, the
whole question ought properly to
be made to hinge upon the contract or undertaking of the bank.
%Vas the paper placed in its hands
for collection or merely for transmission for collection? If for the
former purpose, then it is liable,
but if for the latter, then its liability properly ceases upon its handing the same to a responsible and
well selected person to transact the
business required, as has been
decided by the Courts in England,
and by those of Indiana, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
South Carolina, and by the Court
in Minnesota, as shown by the
principal case, and supported by
the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States as already
pointed out in this annotation.
ERNEST WATTS.
Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of the United Stales.
CUNNINGHAM, SHERIFF v. NEAGLE.
Upon an appeal to the Supreme Court from the action a circuit court
upon a writ of habeascorpus, the Supreme Court must exainine the evidence taken in the circuit court, to sustain or defeat the right of the petitioner to his discharge.
A deputy United States Marshal who kills a person assaulting a Circuit
Judge while traveling lis Circuit, is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus,
when arrested by the State officials under a charge of murder.
Any duty of a deputy United States Marshal, which is fairly inferable
fr6m his office, when legally performed, is an act done in pursuance of a
law of the United States, and entitles him to release from arrest by State
authorities, performance charging the act to bea crime.
A deputy United States Marshal charged with the execution of the
laws of the United States, has the powers of a peace officer and may use
force in the performance of his duty.
United States Marshals are ministerial officers, and part of the executive department of the government, with duties beyond those specially
prescribed by Acts of Congress, and arising from the Constitution itself.
The President has authority derived from his office, to protect the
Judges of the United States Courts in the discharge of their duty, without calling upon State officials: and when he uses the civil power, the
Department of Justice is the proper one to direct the means of protection.

Appeal from the United States Circuit Court for the
Northern District of California. The facts are stated in the
opinion.
Hon. G. A. Johnson, Attorney General of California, S.
Shellabarger,J. ff. Wilson and Z. Mdontgomery for the appellant.
Hon. W. H. H. Mfiller, Attorney General of the United
States, Joseblz H. Choate and James C. Carter, for the appellee.
MILLER, J., April 14, 189 o . This is an appeal by Cunningham, Sheriff of the County of San Joaquin, in the State

of California, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of California, discharging David Neagle from the custody of said Sheriff, who
held him a prisoner on a charge of murder. On the 16th
day of August, 1889, there was presented to judge SAWYER,
the Circuit Judge of the United States for the Ninth Circuit,

CUNNINGHAM,

SHERIFF V. NEAGLE.

659

embracing the Northern District of California, a petition
signed, "DAVID NEAGLE, Deputy United States Marshal,"
by A. L. Parish on his behalf. This petition represented
that the said Parish was a deputy-marshal duly appointed
for the Northerii District of California by J. C. Franks, who
was the Marshal of that district.. It further alleged that
David Neagle was, at the time of the occurrences recited in
the petition, and at the time of filing it, a duly-appointed
and acting Deputy United States marshal for the same district. It then proceeded to state that said Neagle was imprisoned, confined, and restrained of his liberty in the county
jail in San Joaquin County, in the State of California, by
Thomas Cunningham, Sheriff of said County, upon a charge
of murder, under a warrant of arrest, a copy of which was
annexed to the petition. The warrant was as follows:
In the Justice's Court of Stockton Township.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ".S.
COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN I'*"

The people of the State of California to any sheriff; constable, marshal,
or policeman of said State, or of the County of SanJoaquin:
Information on oath having been this day laid before me by Sarah A.
Terry that the crime of murder, a felony, has been committed withinsaid County of San Joaquin on the 14th day of August, A. D. 1889, in this,.
that one David S. Terry, a human being then and there being, was wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought, shot, killed,
and murdered, and accusing Stephen J. Field and David Neagle thereof,
you are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above-namedStephen
J. Field and David Neagle, and bring them before me, at my office in the
city of Stockton, or, in case of my absence or inability to act, before the
nearest and most accessible magistrate in the County.
Dated at Stockton, this 14th day of August, A. D. 1889.
H. V. J. SWAIN, Jusiceof the Peace.
The defendant, David Neagle, having been brought before me on this
warrant, is committed for examination to the sheriff of San Joaquin
county, California. Dated August I5, 1889.
H. V. J. SwAIN, Justice of the Peace.

The petition then recites the circumstances of a rencounter
between said Neagle and David S. Terry, in which the
latter was instantly killed by two shots from a revolver in
the hands of the former. The circumstances of this encounter, and of what led to it, will be considered with more
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particularity hereafter. The main allegation of this petition
is that Neagle, as United States Deputy-Marshal, acting
under the orders of Marshal Franks, and in pursuance of
instructions from the Attorney General of the United States,
had, in consequence of an anticipated attempt at violence on
the part of Terry against the Honorable STEPHEN J. FIELD,
a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, been in
attendance upon said Justice, and was sitting by his side at
a breakfast table when a murderous assault was made by
Terry on Judge FIELD, and in defense of the life of the Judge,
the homicide was committed for which Neagle was held by
Cunningham. The allegation is very distinct that Justice
FIELD was engaged in the discharge of his duties as Circuit
Justice of the United States for that Circuit, having held
court at Los Angeles, one of the places at which the court
is by law held, and, having left that court, was on his way
to San Francisco for the purpose of holding the circuit court
at that place. The allegation is also very full that Neagle
was directed by Marshal Franks to accompany him for the
purpose of protecting him, and that these orders of Franks
were given in anticipation of the assault which actually
occurred. It is also stated, in more general terms, that
Marshal Neagle, in killing Terry under the circumstances,
was in the discharge of his duty as an officer of the United
States, and was not, therefore, guilty of a murder, and that
his imprisonment under the warrant held by Sheriff Cunningham is in violation of the laws and Constitution of the
United States, and that he is in custody for an act done in
pursuance of the laws of the United States. This petition
being sworn to by Farish and presented to Judge SAwYER,
he made the following order:
Let a writ of habeascorpus issue in pursuance of the prayer ofthewith-

in petition, returnable before United States Circuit Court for the Northern
District of California.
SANVYR,

CircuitJudge.

The writ was accordingly issued and delivered to Cunningham, who made the following return!

CUNNINGHAM,
COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, I-Shei
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
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To the honorable Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern
District of California :
I hereby certify and return that before the coming to me of the annexed
writ of habeas corpus the said David Neagle was committed to my custody,
and is detained by me by virtue of a warrant issued out of the Justice's
Court of Stockton Township, State of California, County of San Joaquin,
and by the indorsement made upon said warrant. Copy of said warrant
and indorsement is annexed hereto, and made a part of this-return.
Nevertheless, I have the body of the said David Neagle before the
honorable court, as I am in the said writ commanded. August 17, 1889.
THOMAS CUNNINGHAM, Sheriff,
San Joaquin County, California.

Various pleadings and amended pleadings -were made,
-which do not tend much to the elucidation of the matter
before us. Cunningham filed a demurrer to the petition for
the writ of habeas corlus;and Neagle filed a traverse to the

return of the Sheriff, which was accompanied by exhibits,
the substance of which will be hereafter considered, when the
case comes to be examined upon its facts.
The hearing in the Circuit Court was had before Circuit

Judge SAWYEr

and District Judge SABIN.

The Sheriff

Cunningham, was represented by G.A.
AJohnson, Attorney
General of the State of California, and other counsel. A
large body of testimony, documentary and otherwise, was
submitted to the Court, on which, after a full consideration
of the subject, the Court made the following order:
In the matter of DAvID NEAGLE.

On Habeas Corpus.

In the above-entitled matter, the Court, having heard the testimony
introduced on behalf of the petitioner, none having been offered for the
respondent, and also the arguments of the counsel for petitioner and
respondent, and it appearing to the Court that the allegations of the petitioner in his amended answer or traverse to the return of the Sheriff of
San Joaquin County, respondent herein, are true, and that the prisoner is
in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and
in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States,
it is therefore ordered that petitioner be, and he ishereby, discharged from
custody.

From that order, an appeal was allowed, which brings the
case to this Court, accompanied by a voluminous record of
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all the matters which were before the Court on the hearing.
(See 28 AMERICAN LAW REGIsTEI, 585).
If it be true, as stated in this order of the Court discharging the prisoner, that he was held "in custody for an act
done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and in'
custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States," there does not seem to be any doubt that,
under the statute on that subject, he was properly discharged
by the Circuit Court.
Section 753 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:
The writ of habeas corpius shan in no case extend to a prisoner in jail,
unless where he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States, or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is
in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United
States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or is
in custody in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the
United States; or, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domi- ciled therein, is'in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged
right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under
the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign state, or under color
thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations;
or unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to testify.

Rev. Stat. U. S. §§ 751, 752, give power to the Supreme
Court, the Circuit and District Courts, and the several
Justices and Judges of said Courts to issue writs of habeas
conius.

And section 761 declares that when, by the writ of habeas
corpus the petitioner is brought up for a hearing, the "court
or justice or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and
arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and
justice require." 'this, of course, means that if he is held in
custody in violation of the Constitution or a law of the
United States, or for an act done or omitted in pursuance
of a law of the United States, he must be discharged.
By the law, as it existed at the time of the enactment of
the Revised Statutes, an appeal could be taken to the circuit
court from any court of justice or judge inferior to the circuit court in a certain class of habeas corpuzs cases. But
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there was no appeal to the Supreme Court in any case, except where the prisoner was the subject or citizen of a foreign
State, and was committed or confined under the authority or
law of the United States, or of any State, on account of any
act done or omitted to be done under the commission or
aathority of a foreign State, the validity of which depended
-uponthe law of nations. But afterwards, by the act of Congress of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat. at Large, 437), this .was
extended by amendment as follows:
That section seven hundred and sixty-four of the Revised Statutes be
amended so that the same shall read as follows: From the final decision
of such circuit court an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court in the

cases described in the preceding section.

The preceding section here referred to is section 763, and
is the one on which the prisoner relies for his discharge from
custody in this case.
Section 763 provides, among other cases, for the issuing
of writs of habeas corfius by the circuit courts on petition of
persons alleged to be restrained of their liberty in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States. '
It will be observed that in both the provisions of the Revised Statutes and of this latter act of Congress, the mode of
-review, whether by the circuit c6urt of the judgment of an
inferior court or justice or judge, or by this Court, of the
judgment of a circuit court, the word "appeal," and not
"writ of error," is used; and, as Congress has always used
these words with a clear understanding of what is meant by
them, namely, that by a writ of error only questions of law
are brought up for review, as in actions at common law,
while by an appeal, except when specially provided other-wise, the entire case, on both law and facts, is to be reconsidered, there seems to be little doubt that, so far as it is
essential to a proper decision of this case, the appeal requires
us to examine into the evidence brought to sustain or defeat
the right of the petitioner t o his discharge.
The history of the incidents which led to the tragic event
of the killing of Terry by the prisoner, Neagle, had its origin
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in a suit brought by William Sharon, of Nevada, in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, against Sarah Althea Hill, alleged to be a citizen of
California, for the purpose of obtaining a decree adjudging
a certain instrument in writing possessed and exhibited by
her, purporting to be a declaration of marriage between them
under the Code of California, to be a forgery, and to have it
set aside and annulled.
This suit, which was commenced
Oftober 3, 1883, was finally heard before Judge SAWYER,
the Circuit Judge for that Circuit and Judge DEADY, United
States District Judge for Oregon, who had been duly appointed to assist in holding the Circuit Court for the District of California. The hearing was on September 29, 1885,
and on the 15th of January, i886, a decree was rendered,
granting the prayer of the bill. In that decree, it was declared that the instrument purporting to be a declaration of
marriage, set out and described in the bill of complaint,
"was not signed or executed at any time by William Sharon,
the complainant; that it is not genuine; that it is false,
counterfeited, fabricated, forged, and fraudulent, and, as such,
is utterly null and void. And it is further ordered and decreed that the respondent, Sarah Althea Hill, deliver up and
deposit with the clerk of the court said instrument, to be
indorsed 'Canceled,' and that the clerk write across it, 'Canceled,' and sign his name and affix his seal thereto." The
rendition of this decree was accompanied by two opinions;
the principal one being written by Judge DEADY, and a concurring one by Judge SAWYER.
They were very full in
their statement of the fraud and forgery practiced by Miss
Hill, and stated that it was also accompanied by perjury, and,
inasmuch as Mr. Sharon had died between the hearing of
the argument of the case, on the 29th of September, 1885,
and the time of rendering this decision, January i5, [886,
an order was made setting forth that fact, and declaring that
the decree was entered as of the date of the hearing, nzunc
pro /hin.
Nothing was done under this decree. The defendant,
Sarah Althea Hill, did not deliver up the instrument to the
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clerk to be canceled, but she continued to insist upon its use
in the State court. Under these circumstances, Frederick
W. Sharon, as the executor of the will of his father, William Sharon, filed in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, on March 12, 1888, a bill of revivor, stating the circumstances of the decree, the death of his father,
and that the decree had not been performed; alleging, also,
the inter-marriage of Miss Hill with David S. Terry, of the
City of Stockton, in California, and making the said Terry
and wife parties to this bill of revivor. The defendants both
demurred and answered, resisting the prayer of the plaintiff,
and denying that the petitioner was entitled to any relief.
This case was argued in the Circuit Court before FIELD, Cir-

cuit Justice, SAWYER, Circuit Judge, and SABIN, District
Judge. While the matter was held under advisement,
Judge SAWYER, on returning from Los Angeles, in the Southern District of California, where he had been holding court,
found himself on the train as it left Fresno, which is understood to have been the residence of Terry and wife, in a car
in which he noticed that Mr. and Mrs. Terry were in a section behind him, on the same side. On this tripfrom Fresno
to San Francisco, Mrs. Terry grossly insulted Judge SAWYER,
and had her husband change seats so as to sit directly in
front of the Judge, while she passed him with insolent remarks, and pulled his hair with a vicious jerk, and then,
in an excited manner, taking a seat by her husband's side,
said:I will give him a taste of what he will get by and by.
this decision if he dares.

Let him render

The decision being the one already mentioned, thenunder
advisement Terry then made some remark about too many
witnesses being in the car, adding thatThe best thing to do with him would be to take him out into the bay
and drown him.

These incidents were witnessed by two gentlemen who
knew all the parties, and whose testimony is found in the
record before us. This was August 14, 1888. On the 3 d
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of September the Court rendered its decision, granting the
prayer of the bill of revivor in the name of Frederick W.
Sharon and against Sarah Althea Terry and her husband,
David S. Terry. The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice
FIELD, and during its delivery a scene of great violence occurred in the court-room. It appears that shortly before the
Court opened on that day, both the defendants in the case came
into the court-room-and took seats within the bar at thetable
next the clerk's desk, and almost immediately in front of
the judges. Besides Mr. Justice FIELD, there were present
on the bench Judge SAWYER and Judge SABIN, of the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada.
The defendants had denied the jurisdiction of the Court
ori-inally to render the decree sought to be revived, and the
opinion of the Court necessarily discussed this question, without reaching the merits of the controversy. When allusion
was made to this question, Mrs. Terry arose from her seat,
and, addressing the Justice who was delivering the opinion,
asked, in an excited manner, whether he was going to order
her to give up the marriage contract to be canceled. Mr.
Justice FIELD said
Be seated, madam.

She repeated the question, and was again told to be seated.
She then said, in a very excited and violent manner, that Justice FIELD had been bought, and wanted to know the price
he had sold himself for; that he had got Newland's money
for it, and everybody knew that he had got it, or words to that
effect: Mr. Justice FIELD then directed the Marshal to remove her from the court-room. She asserted that she would
not go from the room, and that no one could take her from
it. Marshal Franks proceeded to carry out the order of the
Court by attempting to compel her to leave, when Terry,
her husband, arose from his seat under great excitement, exclaiming that no man living should touch his wife, and
struck the Marshal a blow in his face so violent as to knock
out a tooth. He then unbuttoned his coat, thrust his hand
under his vest, apparently for the *purpose of drawing a
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bowie-knife, when he was seized by persons present, and
forced down on his back. In the meantime Mrs. Terry was
removed from the court-room by the Marshal, and Terry was
allowed to rise, and was accompanied by officers to the door
leading to the Marshal's office. As he was about leavingthe
room, or immediately after being out of it, he succeeded in
drawing abowie-knife, when his arms were seized by a deputy
marshal, and others present, to prevent him from using it;
and they were able to wrench it from him only after a severe
struggle. The most prominent person engaged in wresting
the knife from Terry was Neagle, the prisoner now in Court.
For this conduct both Terry and his wife were sentenced by
the Court to imprisonment for contempt,-Mrs. Terry for
one month and Terry for six months; and these sentences
were immediately carried into effect. Both the judgment of
the Court on the petition for the revival of the decree in the
case of Sharon against Hill, and the judgment of the Circuit Court, imprisoning Terry and wife for contempt, have
been brought to this Court for review; and, in both cases,
the judgments have been affirmed.. The report of the cases
may be found in Ex larte Terry (1888), 128 U. S. 289,
and Terry v. Sharon (1889), 131 U. S. 40.
Terry and Mrs. Terry were separately indicted by the
grand jury of the Circuit Court of the United States, during
the same term, for their part in these transactions; and the
cases were pending in said Court at the time of Terry's
death. It also appears that Mrs. Terry, during her part of
this altercation in the court-room, was making efforts to open
a small satchel which she had with her, but through her excitement she failed. This satchel, which was taken from
her, was found to have in it a revolving pistol.
From that time until his death, the denunciations by Terry
and his wife of Mr. Justice FIELD were open, frequent, and
of the most vindictive and malevolent character. While being transported from San Francisco to Alameda, where they
were imprisoned, Mrs. Terry repeated a number of times
that she would kill both Judge FIELD and Judge SAWYER.
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Terry, who was present, said nothing to restrain her, but added that he was not through with Judge FI ELD yet; and,
while in jail at Alameda, Terry said that after he got out of
jail, he would horsewhip Judge FIELD, and that he did not
believe he would ever return to California, but this earth was
not large enough to keep him from finding Judge FIELD and
horsewhipping him; and, in reply to a remark that this
would be a dangerous thing to do, and that Judge FIEL>
would resent it, he said :If'Judge FIEr, resents it, I will kill him.

And while in jail Mrs. Terry exhibited to a witness Terry's
knife, at which he laughed, and said:Yes, I always carry that.

And made a remark about judges and marshals, that they
were all a lot of cowardly curs, and he would see some of
them in their graves yet. Mrs. Terry also said that she
expected to kill Judge FIELD some day. Perhaps the clearest expression of Terry's feelings and intentions in the matter
was in a conversation with Mr. Thomas T. Williams, editor
of one of the daily newspapers in California. This interview
was brought about by a message from Terry requesting
Williams to call and see him. In speaking of the occurrences in the Court, he said that Justice FIELD had put a lie
in the recoid about him, and when he met FIELD, he would
have to take that back. And if he did not take it back,
and apologize for having lied about him, he would slap his
face or pull his nose.
I said to him, said the witness, Judge Terry, would not that be a dangerous thing to do? Justice IrD is not a man who would permit anyone
to put a deadly insult upon him, like that.
He said, Oh, FEXD won't fight.
I said: Well Judge, I have found nearly all men will fight.

Nearly

every man will fight when there is occasion for it, and Judge F=Lr.D has
had a character in this State of having the courage of his convictions,

and being a brave man.
At the conclusion of that branch of the conversation, I said to him :
Well, Judge .FExrD is not your physical equal, and if any trouble should.
occur he would be very likely to use a weapon.

He said: Well, that's as good a thing as I[ want to get.

CUNNINGHAM,

SHERIFF V. NEAGLE.

The whole impression conveyed to me by this conversation was that he
felt he had some cause of grievance against Judge FIELD; that he
hoped they might meet, that he might have an opportunity to force a
quarrel upon him, and he would get him into a fight.

Mr. Williams says that after the return of Justice FIELD
to California, in the spring or summer of 1889, he had other
conversations with Terry, in which the same vindictive feelings of hatred were manifested and expressed by him. It is
useless to go over the testimony on this subject more particularly. It is sufficient to say that the evidence is abundant that both Terry and wife contemplated some attack
upon Judge FIELD during his official visit to California in
the summer of 1889, which they intended should result in
his death. Many of these matters were published in the
newspapers, and the press of California was filled with the
conjectures of a probable attack by Terry on justice FIELD,
as soon as it became known that he was going to attend the
Circuit Court in that year.
So much impressed were the friends of Judge FIELD, and
of public justice, both in California and in Washington, with
the fear that he would fall a sacrifice to the resentment of
Terry and his wife, that application was made to the Attorney General of the United States, suggesting the propriety
of his furnishing some protection to the Judge while in California. This resulted in a correspondence between the Attorney General of the United States, the District Attorney,
and the Marshal of the Northern District of California on
that subject This correspondence is here set out:
Department of Justice,
VASHINGTON, D. C., April 2 7th, 1889.
Uynted States Marshal,
San Francisco, Cal.
Sir:
The proceedings which have heretofore been had in connection with
the case of Mr. and Mrs. Terry in your United States Circuit Court have
become matter of public notoriety, and I deem it my duty to call your
attention to the propriety of exercising unusual caution, in case further
proceedings shall be had in that case, for the protection of his honor,
Justice FIELD, or whoever may be called upon to hear and determine the
matter. Of course, I do not know what may be the feelings or purpose of
JOHN C. FRANXS,
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Mr. and Mrs. Terry in the premises, but many things which have happened indicate that violence on their part is not impossible. It is due to
the dignity and independence of the Court, and the character of itsJudge,
that no effort on the part of the government shall be spared to make them
feel entirely safe and free from anxiety in the discharge of their high
duties. You will understand, of course, that this letter is not for the
public, but to put you upon your guard. It will be proper for you to show
it to the District Attorney if deemed best.
Yours truly,
W. H. If. MILLER, Allorney General.
United States Marshal's Office, Northern District of California,
SAN FRANCISCO, May 6, i889.
HON. W. H. H. MILLER,
Atttor.vey General,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
Yours of the 27 th ultimo at hand. When the Hon. Judge LORENZO
SAWYER, our CircuitJudge, returned from Los Angeles, some time before the celebrated court scene, and informed me of the disgraceful action
of Mrs. Terry towards him on the cars while her husband sat in front,
smilingly approving it, I resolved to watch the Terrys (and so notified my
deputies), whenever they should enter the court-room, to be ready to suppress the very first indignity offered by either of them to the judges.
After this, at the time of their ejectment from the court-room, when I
held Judge Terry and his wife as prisoners in my private office, and heard
his threats against Justice FIErD, I was more fully determined than ever
to throw around the Justice andJudge SAWYER, every safeguard I could.
I have given the matter careful consideration, with the determination to
fully protect the federal judges at this time, trusting that the department
will reimburse me for any reasonable expenditure. I have always, whenever there is any liklihood of either Judge or Mrs. Terry appearing in
court, had a force of deputies with myself on hand to watch their every
action. You can rest assured that when Justice FILD arrives he, as well
as all the federal judges, will be protected from insults, and wherean order
is made, it will be executed without fear as to consequences. I shall follow your instructions, and ret with more than usual caution. I have
already consulted with the United States Attorney, J. T. Carey, Rsq., as
to the advisability of making application to you, at the time the Terrys
are tried upon criminal charges, for me to select two or more detectives
to assist in the case, and also assist me in protecting Justice FLD while
in my district. I wish the judges to feel secure, and for this purpose will
see to it that their every wish is promptly obeyed. I notice your remarks
in regard to the publicity of your letter, and will obey your request. I
shall only be too happy to receive any suggestions from you at any time.
The opinion among the better class of citizens here is very bitter against
the Terrys, though, of course, they have their friends, and, unfortunately,
among that class it is necessary to watch.
Your most obedient servant,
J, C. FRANKS,
U. S. Marshal,Northern Dist. of Cal.
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SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., May 7, 1889.
HoN. W. H. H. TMILLER,
U. S. Attorney General,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir:

Marshal Franks exhibited to me your letter bearinig date the 27 th ult.,
addressed to him upon the subject of using due caution by way of protectjug Justice FiELD and the federal judges here in the discharge of their
duties in matters in which the Terrys are interested. I noted your suggestion with a great degree of pleasure, not because our Marshal is at all
disposed to leave anything undone within his authority or power to do,
but because it encouraged him to know and feel that the head of our Department was in full sympathy with the efforts being made to protect the
judges, and vindicate the dignity of our courts. I write merely tosuggest
that there is just reason, in the light of the past and the threats made by
Judge and Mrs. Terry against Justice FIELD and Judge SAWYER, to apprehend personal violence at any moment and at any place, as well in
court as out of court, and that, while due caution has always been taken
by the Marshal when either Judge or Mrs Terry is about the building in
which the courts are held, he has not felt it within his authority to guard
either Judge SAWYER or Justice FIELD against harm when away from the
appraisers' building. Discretion dictates, however, that a protection
should be thrown about them at other times and places, when proceedings
are being had before them in which the Terrys are interested; and I verily
believe, in view of the direful threats made against Justice FIELD, that he
will be in great danger at all times while here. Mr. Franks is a prudent,
cool, and courageous officer, who will not abuse any authority granted
him. I would therefore suggest that he be authorized, in his discretion,
to retain one or more deputies, at such times as he may deem necessary,
for the purposes suggested. That publicity may not be given to the
matter, it is important that the deputies whom he may select be not
known as such; and, that efficient service may be assured for the purposes indicated, it seems to me that they should be strangersto the Terrys.
The Terrys are unable to appreciate that an officer should perform his official duty when that duty in any way requires his efforts to be directed
against them. The Marshal, his deputies, and myself suffer daily indignities and insults from Mrs. Terry, in court and out of court, committed
in the presence of her husband, and without interference upon his part.
I do not propose being deterred from any duty, nor do I purpose being intimidated in the least degree from doing my whole duty in the premises;
but I shall feel doubly assured in being able to do so knowing that our
Marshal has your kind wishes and encouragement in doing everything
needed to protect the officers of the court in the discharge of their duties.
This, of course, is not intended for the public files of your office, nor will
it be on file in my office. Prudence dictates great caution on the part of
the officials who may be called upon to have anything to do in the premises, and I deem it to be of the greatest importance that the suggestions
back and forth be confidential. I shall write you further upon the subject
of these cases in a few days. I have the honor to be your most obedient
JOHN T. CAREY, U. S. Attorney.
servant.
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Department of Justice,
WAsHINGT ON, D. C., May 27, 1889.

C. FRANKS, Esq.,

U. S. -ifarshal,
San Francisco, Cal.

Sir:
Referring to former correspondence of the Department, relating to a
possible disorder in the session of the approaching term of court, owing
to the small number of bailiffs under your control to preserve order, you

are directed to employ certain special deputies at a per dienz of five dollars, payable out of the appropriation for fees and expenses of marshals,
to be submitted to the court, as a separate account from your other ac-

counts against the government, for approval, under section 846, Revised
Statutes, as an extraordinary expense, that the same may be forwarded
to this Department in order to secure executive action and approval.
Very respectfully,

W. H. H. MILLER, Atorney General.

The result of this correspondence was that Marshal Franks
appointed Mr. Neagle a Deputy-Marshal for the Northern
District of California, and gave him special instructions to
attend upon Judge FIELD, both in court and while going
from one court to another, and protect him from any assault
that might be attempted upon him by Terry and wife. Accordingly, when Judge FIELD went from San Francisco to
Los Angeles, to hold the Circuit Court of the United States
at that place, Mr. Neagle accompanied him, remained with
him for the few days that he was engaged in the business of
that Court, and returned with him to San Francisco. It
appears from the uncontradicted evidence in the case that,
while the sleeping-car in which were Justice FIELD and Mr.
Neagle stopped a moment, in the early morning, at Fresno,
Terry and wife got on the train. The fact that they were
on the train became known to Neagle, and he held a conversation with the conductor as to what peace-officers could
be found at Lathrop, where the train stopped for breakfast;
and the conductor was requested to telegraph to the proper
officers of that place to have a constable or some peace-officer
on the ground when the train should arrive, anticipating
that there might be violence attempted by Terry upon judge
FIELD. It is sufficient to say that this resulted in no available aid to assist in keeping the peace. When the train arrived, Neagle informed Judge FIELD of the presence of Terry
on the train, and advised him to remain, and take his break-
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fast in the car. This the Judge refused to do, and he and
Neagle got out of the car, and 'vent into the dining-room,
and took seats beside each other in the place assigned them
by the person in charge of the breakfast-room; and very
shortly after this Terry and wife came into the room, and
Mrs. Terry, recognizing Judge FIELD, turned and left in
great haste, while Terry passed beyond where Judge FIELD
and Neagle were, and took his seat at another table.. It was
afterwards ascertained that Mrs. Terry went to the car, and
took from it a satchel in which was a revolver. Before she
returned to the eating-room, Terry arose from his seat, and,
passing around the table in such a way as brought him behind Judge FIELD, who did not see him or notice him, came
up where he was sitting with his feet under the table, and
struck him a blow on the side of his face, which was repeated on the other side. He also had his arm drawn back
and his fist doubled up, apparently to strike a third blow,
when Neagle, who had been observing him all this time,
arose from his seat with his revolver in his hand, and in a
very loud voice shouted out:
Stop ! Stop! I am an officer !

Upon this, Terry turned his attention to Neagle, and, as
Neagle testifies, seemed to recognize him, and immediately
turned his hand to thrust it in his bosom, as Neagle felt sure,
with the purpose of drawing a bowie-knife. At this instant
Neagle fired two shots from his revolver into the body of
Terry, who immediately sank down, and died in a few minutes. Mrs. Terry entered the room, with the satchel in her
hand, just after Terry sank to the floor. She rushed up to
the place where he was, threw herself upon his body, made
loud exclamations and moans, and commenced inviting the
spectators to avenge her -wrong upon FiELD and Neagle.
She appeared to be carried away by passion, and in a very
earnest manner charged that FIELD and Neagle had murdered her husband intentionally; and shortly afterwards she
appealed to the persons present to examine the body of Terry
to see that he had no weapons. This she did once or twice.
VOL. XXXVIII.-
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The satchel which she had, being taken from her, was found
to contain a revolver.
These are the material circumstances produced in evidence
before the circuit court on the hearing of this habeas corpus
case. It is but a short sketch of a history which is given in
over five hundred pages in the record, but we think it is sufficient to enable us to apply the law of the case to the question before us. Without a more minute discussion of this
testimony, it produces upon us the conviction of a settled
purpose on the part of Terry and his wife, amounting to a
conspiracy, to murder Justice FIELD; and we are quite sure
that if Neagle had been merely a brother or a friend of Judge
FIELD, traveling with him, and aware of all the previous
relations of Terry to the Judge,-as he was,-of his bitter
animosity, his declared purpose to have revenge even to the
point of killing him, he would have been justified inwhat
he did in defense of Mr. Justice FIELD'S life, and possibly of
his own.
But such a justification would be a proper subject for consideration on a trial of the case for murder in the courts of
the State of California; and there exists no authority in the
courts of the United States to discharge the prisoner while
held in custody by the State authorities for this offense, unless there be found in aid of the defense of the prisoner, some
element of power and authority asserted under the government of the United States. This element is said to be found
in the facts that Mr. justice FIELD, when attacked, was in
the immediate discharge of his duty as Judge of the Circuit
Courts of the United States within California; that the assault upon him grew out of the animosity of Terry and wife,
arising out of the previous discharge of his duty as Circuit
Justice in the case, for which they were committed for contempt of court; and that the Deputy-Marshal of the United
States who killed Terry in defense of FIELD'S life, was
charged with a duty, under the law of the United States, to
protect FIELD from the violence which Terry was inflicting,
and which was intended to lead to FIELD's death. To the
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inquiry whether this proposition is sustained by law and the
facts which we have recited, we now address ourselves.
Mr. Justice FELD was a member of the Supreme Court
of the United States, and had-been a member of that Court
for over a quarter of a century, during which he had become
venerable for his age and for his long and valnable service
in that Court. The business of the Supreme Court has become so exacting that, for many years past, the Justices of it
have been compelled to remain for the larger part of the
year in Washington City, from whatever part of the country
they may have been appointed. The term for each year,
including the necessary travel and preparations to attend at
its beginning, has generally lasted from eight to nine months.
But the Justices of this Court have imposed upon them
other duties, the most important of which arise out of the
fact that they are also Judges of the Circuit Courts of the
United States. Of these circuits there are nine, to each one
of which a Justice of the Supreme Court is allotted, under
section 6o6 of the Revised Statutes, the provision of which
is as followsThe Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court shaaf.
be allotted among the circuits by an order of the Court; and a new allot-ment shall be made whenever it becomes necessary or convenient, byreason of the alteration of any circuit, or of the new appointment of a.
Chief Justice or Associate justice, or otherwise."

Section 61o declares that it "shall be the dutr of the:
Chief Justice and of each Justice of the Supreme Court tv
attend at least one term of the Circuit Court in each district
of the circuit to which he is allotted during every period of
two years." Although this enactment does not require, in,
terms, that the justices shall go to their circuits more than
once in two years, the effect of it is to compel most of them
to do this,. because there are so many districts in many of
the circuits that it is impossible for the Circuit Justice to reach
them all in one year; and the result of this is that he goes
to some of them in one year, and to others in the next year,
thus requiring an attendance in the circuit, every year.
The Justices of the Supreme Court have been members of
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the Circuit Courts of the United States ever since the organization of the government; and their attendance on the circuit, and appearance at the places where the courts are held,
has always been thought to be a matter of importance.
In order to enable him to perform this duty, Mr. Justice
FIELD had to travel each year from Washington City, near
the Atlantic coast, to San Francisco, on the Pacific coast
In doing this, he was as much in the discharge of a duty
imposed upon him by law as he was while sitting in court
and trying causes. There are many duties which the judge
performs outside of the court-room where he sits to pronounce judgment or to preside over a trial. The statutes of
the United States, and the established practice of the courts,
require that the judge perform a very large share of his
judicial labors at what is called "chambers."
This chamber
work is as important, as necessary, as much a discharge of
his official duty, as that performed in the court-house. Important cases are often argued, before the judge at any place
convenient to the parties concerned, and a decision of the
judge is arrived at by investigations made in his own room,
wherever he may be; and it is idle to say that this is not as
much the performance of judicial duty as the filing of the
judgment with the clerk, and the announcement of the
result in open court. So it is impossible for a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, who is compelled by
the obligations of duty to be so much in Washington City,
to discharge his duties of attendance on the Circuit Courts,
as prescribed by section 61o, without traveling, in the usual
and most convenient modes of doing it, to the place where
the court is to be held. This duty is as much an obligation
imposed by the law as if it had said in wordsThe Justices of the Supreme Court shall go from Washington City to
the place where their terms are held every year.

Justice FIELD had not only left Washington, and traveled
the three thousand miles or more which was necessary to
reach his circuit, but he had entered upon the duties of that
circuit, had held the court at San Francisco for some time,
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and, taking a short leave of that court, had gone down to
Los Angeles,- another place where a court was to be held,
and sat as a judge there for several days, hearing cases and
rendering decisions. It was in the necessary act of returning from Los Angeles to San Francisco, by the usual mode
of travel between the two places, where his court was still
in session, and where he was required to be, that he was
assaulted by Terry in the manner which we have already
described.
The occurrence which we are called upon to consider was
of so extraordinary a character that it is not to be expected
that many cases can be found to cite as authority upon the
subject. In the case of U. S. v. The Little Clarles (i819),
i Brock. 380, a question arose before Chief Justice MARSHALL, holding the Circuit Court of the United States for
Virginia, as to the validity of an order made by the District
Judge at his chambers, and not in court. The Act of Congress authorized stated terms of the District Court, and gave
the judge power to hold special courts, at his discretion,
either at the place appointed by the law, or such other place
in the district as the nature of the business and his discretion
should direct He says: "It does not seem to be a violent
construction of such an act to consider the judge as constituting a court whenever he proceeds on judicial business;"
and cites the practice of the courts in support of that view
of the subject. In the case of U. S. v. Gleason (1867),
U. S. C. CL, D. Iowa, I Woolw. i28, the prisoner was indicted
for the murder of two enrolling officers who were charged
with the duty of arresting deserters, or those who had been
drafted into the service and had failed to attend. These men,
it was said, had visited the region of country where they were
murdered, and, having failed of accomplishing their purpose of arresting the deserters, were on their return to their
home when they were killed; and the Court was asked to
instruct the jury that under these circumstances they were
not engaged in the duty of arresting the deserters named.
"It i's
claimed by the counsel for the defendant," says the report, "that

CUNNINGHAM,

SHERIFF V. NEAGLE.

if the parties killed had been so engaged, and had conie to that neighborhood with the purpose of arresting the supposed deserters, but at the
-moment of the assault had abandoned the intention ot making the arrests at that time, and were returning to headquarters at Grinnell with a
view to making other arrangements for arrest at another time, they were
mot so engaged as to bring the case within the law." But the Court held
that this was not a sound construction of the statute, and "that if the
parties killed had come into that neighborhood with intent to arrest the
deserters named, and had been employed by the proper officer for that
service, and were, in the further prosecution of that purpose, returning
to Grinnell with a view to making other arrangements to discharge this
duty, they were still employed in arresting deserters, within the meaning
of the statute. It is not necessary," said the Court, "that the party
killed should be engaged in the immediate act of arrest, but it is sufficient if he be employed in and about that business when assaulted. The
purpose of the law is to protect the life of the person so employed, and
this protection continues so long as he is engaged in a service necessary
and proper to that employment"

We have no doubt that Mr. Justice FIELD, when attacked
by Terry, was engaged in the discharge of his duties as
Circuit Justice of the Ninth Circuit, and was entitled to all
the protection, under those circunstances, which the law
could give him.
It is urged, however, that there exists no statute authorizing any such protection as that which Neagle was instructed
to give Judge FIELD in the present case, and, indeed, no
protection whatever against a vindictive or malicious assault
growing out of the faithful discharge of his official duties;
and that the language of section 753 of the Revised Statutes, that the party seeking the benefit of the writ of habeas
corhus must, in this connection, show that he is "in custody
for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the
United States," makes it necessary that upon this occasion
it should be shown that the act for which Neagle is imprisoned was done by virtue of an act of Congress. It is not
supposed that any special act of Congress exists which
authorizes the marshals or deputy-marshals of the United
,States, in express terms, to accompany the judges of the
Supreme Court through their circuits, and act as a bodyguard to them, to defend them against malicious assaults
against their persons. But we are of opinion that this@ view
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of the statute is an unwarranted restriction of the meaning
of a-law designed to extend in a liberal manner the benefit
of the writ of habeas corpus to persons imprisoned for the
performance of their duty; and we are satisfied that, if it
was the duty of Neagle, under the circumstances,-a duty
which could only arise under the laws of the United States,
-to defend Mr. Justice FIELD from a murderous attack
upon him, he brings himself within the meaning of the
section we have recited.
This view of the subject is confirmed by the alternative
provision that he must be in custody "for an act done or
omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an
order, process, or decree of a court or a judge thereof, or is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or
treaty of the United States." In the view we take of the
Constitution of the United States, any obligation fairly and
properly inferable from that instrument, or any duty of the
marshal to be derived from the general scope of his duties
under the laws of the United States, is a "law," within the
meaning of this phrase. It would be a great reproach to
the system of government of the United States, declared to
be within its sphere sovereign and supreme, if there is to be
found within the domain of its powers no means of protecting the judges, in the conscientious and faithful discharge
of their duties, from the malice and hatred of those upon
whom their judgments may operate unfavorably. It has in
modern times become apparent that the physical health of
the community is more efficiently promoted by hygienic and
preventive means than by the skill which is applied to the
cure of disease after it has become fully developed. So, also,
the law, which is intended to prevent crime, in its general
spread among the community, by regulations, police organization, and otherwise, which are adapted for the protection
of the lives and property of citizens, for the dispersion of
mobs, for the arrest of thieves and assassins, for the watch
which is kept over the community, as well as over this class of
people is more efficient than punishment of crimes after they
have been committed. If a person in the situation of Judge.
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RE LD could have no other guaranty of his personal safety
while engaged in the conscientious discharge of a disagreeable
duty than the fact that, if he was murdered, his murderer
would be subject to the laws of a State, and by those laws
could be punished, the security would be very insufficient.
The plan which Terry and wife had in mind, of insulting
him and assaulting him, and drawing him into a defensive
physical contest, in the course of which they would slay him,
shows the little value of such remedies. We do not believe
that the Government of the United States is thus inefficient,
or that its Constitution and laws have left the high officers
of the Government so defenseless and unprotected.
The views expressed by this Court through Mr. Justice
BRADLEY, in Ex farle Siebold (i88o), 1oo U. S. 371, 394,
are very pertinent to this subject, and express our views with
great force. That was a case of a writ of zabeas corp5us,
where Siebold had been indicted in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Maryland for an offense
committed against the election laws during an election at
which members of Congress and officers of the State of
Maryland were elected. He was convicted and sentenced to
fine and imprisonment, and filed his petition in this Court
for a writ of habeas corftus, to be relieved on the ground that
the- court which had convicted him was without jurisdiction.
The foundation of this allegation was that the Congress of
the United States had no right to prescribe laws for the conduct of the election in question, or for enforcing the laws of
the State of Maryland by the courts of the United States.
In the course of the discussion of the relative powers of the
federal and State courts on this subject, it is said :Somewhat akin to the argument which has been considered, is the objection that the deputy-marshals authorized by the act of Congress to be
created, and to attend the elections, are authorized to keep the peace, and
that this is a duty which belongs to the State authorities alone. It is argued that the preservation of peace and good order in society is notwithin
the powers confined to the government of the United States, but belongs
exclusively to the States.. Here, again, we are met with the theory that
the government of the United States does not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory is founded on an entire
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misconception of the nature and powers of that government. We hold it
to be an incontrovertible principle that the government of the United
States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official
agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions
that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.
This power to enforce its laws and to execute its functions in all places
does not derogate from the power of the State to execute its laws at the
same time and in the same places. The one does not exclude the other,
except where both cannot be executed at the same time. In that case, the
words of the Constitution itself show which is to yield. "This Constitution, and all laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, * * *
shall be the supreme law of the land." * * * Without the concurrent
sovereignty referred to, the national government would be nothing but an
advisory government. Its executive power would be absolutely nullified.
Why do we have marshals at all, if they cannot physically lay theirhands
on persons and things in the performance of their proper duties? What
functions can they perform, if they cannot use force? In executing the
process of the courts, must they call on the nearest constable for protection? Must they rely on him to use the requisite compulsion, and tokeep
the peace, whilst they are soliciting and entreating the parties and bystanders to allow the law to take its course? This is the necessary consequence of the positions that are assumed. If we indulge in such impracticable views as these, and keep on refining and re-refining, we shall drive
the national government out of the United States, and relegate it to the
District of Columbia, or perhaps to some foreign soil. We shall bring it
back to a condition of greater helplessness than that of the old Confederation. * * * It must execute its powers, or it is no government. It
must execute them on the land as well as on the sea, on things as well as
on persons. And, to do this, it must necessarily havepowerto command
obedience, preserve order, and keep the peace; and no person or power
in this land has the right to resist or question its authority, so long as it
keeps within the bounds of its jurisdiction.

At the same term of the court, in the case of Tennessee v.
Dazrh (i88o), 100 U. S. 257, 262, where the same questions
in regard to the relative powers of the federal and State
courts were concerned, in regard to criminal offenses, the
Court expressed its views through Mr. Justice STRONG,
quoting from the case of 1far/inv. Hunter (I816), I Wheat.
(14 U. S.) 363, the following language --The general government must cease to exist whenever it loses the
power of protecting itself in the exercise of its constitutional powers,"
and then proceeding: "It can act only through its officers and agents,
and they must act within the States. If, when thus acting, and within
the scope of their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to
trial in a State court for an alleged offense against the law of the State,
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yet warranted by the federal authority they possess, and if the general
government is powerless to interfere at once for their protection,-if their
protection must be left to the action of the State court,-the operations
of the general government may at any time be arrested at the will of one
of its members. The legislation of a State may be unfriendly. It may
affix penalties to acts done under the immediate direction of the national
government and in obedience to its laws. It may deny the authority conferred by those laws. The State court may administer not only the laws
of the State, but equally federal lav, in such a manner as to paralyze the
operations of the government; and even if, after trial and final judgment
in the State court, the case can be brought into the United States court
for review, the officer is withdrawn from the discharge of his duty during
the pendency of the prosecution, and the exercise of acknowledged federal power arrested. We do not think such an element of weakness is to
be found in the Constitution. The United States is a government with
authority extending over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon
the States and upon the people of the States. While it is limited in the
number of its powers, so far as its sovereignty extends, it is supreme. No
State government can exclude it from the~exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, obstruct its authorized officers against
its will, or withhold from it for a moment the cognizance of any subject
which that instrument has committed to it.

To cite all the cases in which this principle of the supremacy of the government of the United States in the exercise of all the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution
is maintained, would be an endless task. We have selected
these as being the most forcible expressions of the views of
the Court, having a direct reference to the nature of the
case before us. Where, then, are we to look for the protection which we have shown Judge FIELD was entitled to

when engaged in the discharge of his official duties?

Not

to the courts of the United States, because, as has been more

than once said in this Court, in the division of the powers
of government between the three great departments, exec-

utive, legislative, and judicial, the judicial is the weakest for
the purposes of self-protection, and for the enforcement of
the powers which it exercises. The ministerial officers,
through whom its commands must be executed, are marshals of the United States, and belong emphatically to the
executive department of the government. They are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate. They are removable from office at his pleasure.
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They are subjected by act of Congress to the supervision and
control of the Department of Justice, in the hands of one
of the cabinet officers of the President, and their compensation is provided by acts of Congress. The same may be
said of the District attorneys of the United States who
prosecute and defend the claims of the government in the
courts.
The legislative branch of the government can only protect the judicial officers by the enactment of laws for that
purpose, and the argument we are now combating assumes
that no such law has been passed by Congress. If we turn
to the executive department of the government, we find a
very different condition of affairs. The Constitution, § 3,
art. 2, declares that the President "shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed ;" and he is provided with the
means of fulfilling this obligation by his authority to commission all the officers of the United States, and, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the
most important of them, and to fill vacancies. He is declared to be the Commander in chief of the army and navy of
the United States. The duties which are thus imposed
upon him he is further enabled to perform by the recognition in the Constitution, and- the creation by acts of Congress, of executive departments, which have varied in number from four or five to seven or eight, who are familiarly
called "cabinet ministers." These aid him in the performance of the great duties of his office, and represent him in
a thousand acts to which it can hardly be supposed his personal attention is called; and thus he is enabled to fulfill the
duty of his great department, expressed in the phrase that
"he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Is
this duty limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or
of treaties of the United States according to their express
terms ; or does it include the rights, duties, and obligations
growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the
government under the Constitution?
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One of the most remarkable episodes in the history of our
foreign relations, and which has become an attractive historical incident, is the case of Martin Koszta, a native of
Hungary, who, though not fully a naturalized citizen of the
United States, had in due form of law made his declaration
of intention to become a citizen. While in Smyrna he was
seized by command of the Austrian consul-general at that
place, and carried on board the Hussar, an Austrian vessel,
where he was held in close confinement. Captain Ingraham,
in command of the American sloop of war St. Louis, arriving in port at that critical period, and ascertaining that
Koszta had with him his naturalization papers, demanded
his surrender to him, and was compelled to train his guns
upon the Austrian vessel before his demands were complied
with. It was, however, to prevent bloodshed, agreed that
Koszta should be placed in the hands of the French consul,
subject to the result of diplomatic negotiations between
Austria and the United States. The celebrated correspondence between Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, and Chevalier Hulsemann, the Austrian minister at Washington, which
arose out of this affair, and resulted in the release and restoration to liberty of Koszta, attracted a great deal of public
attention; and the position assumed by Mr. Marcy met the
approval of the country and of Congress, who voted a gold
medal to Captain Ingraham for his conduct in the affair.
Upon what act of Congress then existing can any one lay his
finger in support of the action of our government in this
matter ?
So, if the President or the postmaster general is advised
that the mails of the United States, possibly carrying treasure, are liable to be robbed, and the mail carriers assaulted
and murdered, in any particular region of country, who can
doubt the authority of the President, or of one of the executive departments under him, to make an order for the protection of the mail, and of the persons and lives of its carriers, by doing exactly what was done in the case of Mr.
Justice FIELD, namely, providing a sufficient guard, whether
it be by soldiers of the army or by marshals of the United
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States, with a posse comilalus properly armed and equipped,
to secure the safe performance of the duty of carrying the
mail wherever it may be intended to go?
The United States is the owner of millions of acres of
valuable public land, and has been the owner of much more,
which it has sold. Some of these lands owe a large part of
their value to the forests which grow upon them. These forests are liable to depredations by people living in the neighborhbod, known as "timber thieves," who make a living by
cutting and selling such timber, and who are trespassers. But
until quite recently, even if there be one now, there was no
statute authorizing any preventive measures for the protection of this valuable public property. Has the President no
authority to place guards upon the public territory to protect its timber? No authority to seize the timber when cut
and found upon the ground? Has he no power to take any
measures to protect this vast domain ? rortunately, we find
this question answered by this court in the case of Wells v.
Nickles (1882), 104 U. S. 444.
That was a case in which a class of men appointed by
local land officers, under instructions from the Secretary of
the Interior, having found a large quantity of this timber
cut down from the forests of the United States, and lying
where it was cut, seized it. The question of the title to this
property coming in controversy between Wells and Nickles,
it became essential to inquire into the authority of these
timber agents of the government, thus to seize the timber
cut by trespassers on its lands. The Court said:
The effort we have made to akcertain and fix the authority of these
timber agents by any positive provision of law has been unsuccessful.

But the Court, notwithstanding there was no special
statute for it, held that the Department of the Interior; acting
under the idea of protecting from depredation timber on the
lands of the government, had gradually come to assert the
right to seize what is cut and taken away from them wherever it can be traced, and in aid of this the registers and receivers of the Land-office had, by instructions fr6m the Sec-
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retary of the Interior, been constituted agents of the United
States for these purposes, with power to appoint special
agents under themselves. And the Court upheld the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to make these rules
and regulations for the protection of the public lands.
One of the cases in this court in which this question was
presented in the most imposing form is that of U. S. v. Tin
Co. (1888), 125 U. S. 273.

In that case, a suit was brought

in the name of the United States, by order of the Att6rney
General, to set aside a patent which had been issued for a
large body, of valuable land, on the ground that it was obtained from the government by fraud and deceit practiced
upon its officers. A preliminary question was raised by
counsel for defendant, which was earnestly insisted upon, as
to the right of the Attorney General, or any other officer of
the government, to institute such a suit in the absence of
any act of Congress authorizing it. It was conceded that
there was no express authority given to the Attorney General to institute that particular suit, or any suit of that class.
The question was one of very great interest, and was very
ably argued both in the court below and in this Court. The
response of this Court to that suggestion conceded that in
the acts of Congress establishing the Department of Justice
and defining the duties of the Attorney General there was
no such express authority; and it was said that there was
also no express authority to him to bring suits against debtors of the government upon bonds, or to begin criminal
prosecutions, or to institute criminal proceedings in any of
the cases in which the United States was plaintiff, yet he
was invested with the general superintendence of all such
suits. It was further said:
If the United States, in any particular case, has a just cause for calling
upon the judiciary of the country, in any of its courts, forrelief, by setting
aside or annulling any of its contracts, its obligations, or its most solemn
instruments, the question of the appeal to the judicial tribunals of the
country must primarily be decided by the Attorney General of the United
States. That such a power should exist somewhere, and that the United
States should not be more helpless in relieving itself from frauds, impostures, and deceptions than the private individual, is hardly open to Argu-
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ment. * * * There must, then, be an officer or officers of the government to determine when the United States shall sue, to decide for what it
shall sue, and to be responsible that such suits shall be brought in appropriate cases. The attorneys of the United States in every judicial district are officers of this character, and they are by statute under the immediate supervision and control of the Attorney General. How, then,
can it be argued that if the United States has been deceived, entrapped,
or defrauded into the making, under the forms of law, of an instrument
which injuriously affects its rights of property, or other rights, it cannot
bring a suit to avoid the effect of such instrument thus fraudulently obtained without a special act of Congress in each case, or without some
special authority applicable to this class of cases?

The same question was raised in the earlier case of U. S.
v. Hughes (i85o), ii How. (52 U. S.) 552, and decided the
same way.
We cannot doubt the power of the President to take
measures for the protection of a judge of one of the courts of
the United States who, while in the discharge of the duties
of his office, is threatened with a personal attack which may
probably result in his death; and we think it clear that
where this protection is to be afforded through the civil
power, the Department of Justice is the proper one to set in
motion the necessary means of protection. The correspondence, already recited in this opinion, between the Marshal of
the Northern District of California and the Attorney General and the District Attorney of the United States for that
District, although prescribing no very specific mode of
affording this protection by the Attorney General, is sufficient,
we think, to warrant the Marshal in taking the steps which
he did take, in making the provisions which he did make,
for the protection and defense of Mr. Justice PIMLD.
But there is positive law investing the marshals and their
deputies with powers which not only justify what Marshal
Neagle did in this matter, but which imposed it upon him
as a duty. In chapter 14, title 13, of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, which is devoted to the appointment
and duties of the district attorneys, marshals, and clerks of
the courts of the United States, section 788 declares:
The marshals and their deputies shall have, in each State, the same
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powers in executing the laws of the United States as the sheriffs and their
deputies in such State may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof.

If, therefore, a sheriff of the State of California, was authorized to do in regard to the laws of California what Neagle
did-that is, if he was authorized to keep the peace, to protect a judge from assault and murder-then Neagle was
authorized to do the same thing in reference to the laws of
the United States. Section 4176 of the Political Code of
California reads as follows:
The sheriff must (i) preserve the peace; (2) arrest and take before the
nearest magistrate, for examination, all persons -who attempt to commit,
or have committed, a public offense; (3) prevent and suppress all affrays,
breaches of the peace, riots, and insurrections which may come to his
knowledge.

And the Penal Code of California declares (section 197)
that homicide is justifiable when committed by any person
"when resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to
commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any
person," or "when committed in defense of habitation, property, or person against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony." That
there is a peace of the United States; that a man assaulting
a judge of the United States while in the discharge of his
duties, violates that peace; that in: such case the marshal of
the United States stands in the same relation to the peace of
the United States which the sheriff of the county does to the
peace of the State of California-are questions too clear to
need argument to prove them. That it would be the duty
of a sheriff, if one had been present at this assault by Terry
upon Judge FrELD, to prevent this breach of the peace, to
prevent this assault, to prevent the. Murder which -was contemplated by it, cannot be doubted. And if, in performing
his duty, it became necessary, for the protection of Judge
FIELD or of himself, to kill Terry, in a case where, like this,
it was evidently a question of the choice of who should be
killed-the assailant and violator of the law and disturber of
the peace, or the unoffending man who was in his powerthere can be no question of the authority of the sheriff to
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-have killed Terry. So the marshal of the United States,
charged with the duty of protecting and guarding the judge
of the United States court against this special assault upon
his person and his life, being present at the critical moment,
when prompt action was necessary, found it to be his duty
-a duty which he had no liberty to refuse to perform-to
take the steps which resulted in Terry's death. This duty
was imposed on him by the section of the Revised Statutes
which we have recited, in connection with the powers conferred by the State of California upon its peace officers, which
become, by this statute, in proper cases, transferred as duties
to the marshals of the United States.
But, all these questions being conceded, it is urged against
the relief sought by this writ of zabeas corpus that the question of the guilt of the prisoner of the crime of murder is a
question to be determined by the laws of California, and to
be decided by its courts, and that there exists no power in
the government of the United States to take away the prisoner from the custody of the proper authorities of the State
of California, and carry him before a judge of the court of
the United States, and release him without a trial by jury
according to the laws of the State of California. That the
statute of the United States authorizes and directs such a proceeding and such a judgment in a case where the offense
charged against the prisoner consists in an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and by virtue of its
authority, and where the imprisonment of the party is in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States,
is clear by its express language.
The enactments now found in the Revised Statutes of the
United States on the subject of the writ of habeas corpus are
the result of a long course of legislation forced upon Congress by the attempt of the States of the Union to exercise
the power of imprisonment over officers and other persons
asserting rights under the federal government or foreign
governments, which the States denied. The original act of
Congress on the subject of the writ of habeas corpus, by its
fourteenth section, authorized the judges and the courts of
VOL. XXXVIII.-44.
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the United States, in the case of prisoners in jail or in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States,
or committed for trial before some court of the same, or
when necessary to be brought into court to testify, to issue
the writ, and the judge or court before whom they were
brought was directed to make inquiry into the cause of commitment: i Stat. at Large 81. This did not present the
question, or at least it gave rise to no question which came
before the courts, as to releasing by this-writ, parties held in
custody under the laws of the States. But when, during
the controversy growing out of the nullification laws of
South Carolina, officers of the United States were arrested
and imprisoned for the performance of their duties in collecting the revenue of the United States in that State, and
held by the State authorities, it became necessary for the
Conzgress of the United States to take some action for their
relief. Accordingly the act of Congress of March 2, 1833
(4 Stat. at Large 634), among other remedies for such condition of affairs, provided by its seventh section, that the
federal judges should grant writs of habeas cor/ts in all cases
of a prisoner in jail or confinement, where he should be
committed or confined on or by any authority or law for
any act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of
the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any
judge or court thereof.
The next extension of the circumstances on which a writ
of corf us habeas might issue by the federal judges arose out
of the celebrated McLeod Case, in which McLeod, charged
with murder, in a State court of New York, had pleaded
that he was a British subject, and that what he had done,
was under and by the authority of his government, and
should be a matter of international adjustment, and that he
was not subject to be tried by a court of New York under
the laws of that State. The federal government acknowledged the force of this reasoning, and undertook to obtain
from the government of the State of New York, the release of the prisoner, but failed.
He was, however, tried
and acquitted, and afterwards released by the State of New
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York. This led to an extension of the powers of the federal
judges under the writ of habeas corpis by the act of August
29, 1842 (5Stat. at Large 539), entitled "An act to provide
further remedial justice in the courts of the United States."
It conferred upon them the power to issue a writ of habeas
co pts in all cases where the prisoner claimed that the act
for which he was held in custody was done under the sanction of any foreign power, and where the validity and effect
of this plea depended upon the law of nations. In advocating the bill, which afterwards became a lawy on this subject,
Senator Berrien, who introduced it into the Senate, observed:
The object was to allow a foreigner prosecuted in one of the States.
of the Union for an offense committed in that State, but which, he pleads,.
has been committed under authority of his own sovereignty or the authority of the law of nations, to be brought up on that issue before the onlycompetentjudicial power to decide upon matters involved in foreign relations or the law of nations. The plea must show that it has reference
to the laws or treaties of the United States or the law of nations; and
showint this, the writ of habeas corpus is awarded to try that issue. If'it
shall appear that the accused has a bar on the plea alleged, it is right and
proper that he should not be delayed in prison, awaiting the proceedings
of the State jurisdiction in the preliminary issue of his plea at bar. If
satisfied of the existence in fact and validity in law of the bar, the federal
jurisdiction will have the power of administering prompt relief.

No more forcible statement of the principle on which the
law of the case now before us stands can be made.
The next extension of the powers of the court under the
writ of habeas coryuts was the act of February 5, 1867 (x4i
Stat. at Large 385) ; and this contains the broad ground of
the present Revised Statutes, under which the relief is sought
in the case before us, and includes all cases of restraint of
liberty in violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty of
the United States, and declares that "the said court or
judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts
of the case, by hearing testimony and the arguments of the
parties interested, and, if it shall appear that the petitioner is
deprived of his or her liberty in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United States, he or she shall forthwith be discharged and set at liberty."
It would seem as if the argument might close here. If
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the duty of the United States to protect its officers from
violence, even to death, in discharge of the duties which its
laws impose upon them, be established, and Congress has
made the writ of habeas corpus one of the means by which
this protection is made efficient, and if the facts of this case
show that the prisoner was acting both under the authority
-of law and the directions of his superior officers of the Department of Justice, we can see no reason -why this writ
,should not be madeto serve its purpose in the present case.
-We have already cited such decisions of this Court as are
most important and directly in point, and there is a series of
-cases decided by the circuit and district courts to the same
'purport. Several of these arose out of proceedings under
"the fugitiiie-slave law, in which the marshal of the United
:States, while engaged in apprehending the fugitive slave
with a view to returning him to his master in another
State, was arrested by the authorities of the State. In many
of these cases, they made application to the judges of the
United States for relief by the writ of habeas corfius, which
gave rise to several very interesting decisions on this subject In Exjarte Jenkins (1853), U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Pa., 2
Wall. Jr. 5?I, 529, the Marshal, who had been engaged,
%Yhile executing a warrant, in arresting a fugitive, in a
bloody encounter, was himself arrested under a warrant of a
Justice of the Peace for assault with intent to kill, which
makes the case very analogous to the one now under consideration. He presented to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a petition for
.a writ of, habeas corpus, which was heard before Mr. Justice
GIER, who held that under the act of 1833, already referred

to, the Marshal was entitled to his discharge, because
what he had done was in pursuance of and by the authority
conferred upon him by the act of Congress concerning the
rendition'.of fug-itive slaves. He said:
The authority conferred on the judges of the United States by this act
of Congress gives them all the power that any other court could exercise
under the writ of habeas corpus, or gives them none at all. If, under'
such a writ, they may not discharge their officer when imprisoned "by any
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authority" for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, it
would be impossible to discover for what useful purpose the act was.
passed. * * * It was passed when a certain State of this Union
had threatened to nullify acts of Congress, and to treat those as criminals,
who should attempt to execute them; and it was intended as a remedy
against such State legislation.

This same matter was up again when the fugitive slave,
Thomas, had the marshal arrested in a civil suit for an alleged
assault and battery. He was carried before Judge KANIE on
another writ of habeas corpus, and again released: Id. 53 I.
A third time the Marshal, being indicted, was arrested on a
bench warrant, issued by the State court, and again
brought before the Circuit Court of the United States by a
writ of habeas corpis, and discharged. Some remarks of
Judge KANrE on this occasion are very pertinent to the objections raised in the present case. He said : Id. 543.
It has been urged that my order, if it shall withdraw the relators from
the prosecution pending against them [in the State court], will, in effect,
prevent their trial by jury at all, since there is no act of Congress under
which they can be indicted for an abuse of process. It will not be an
anomaly, however, if the action of this Court shall interfere with the trial
of these prisoners by a jury. Our constitutions secure that mode of trial
as a right to the accused; but they nowhere recognize it as a right of the
government, either State or federal, still less of an individual prosecutor.
The action of a jury is overruled constantly by the granting of new trials
after conviction. It is arrested by the entering of nzolle Prosequis while
the case is at bar. It is made ineffectual at any time by the discharge on
habeas corpius. * * " And there is no harm in this. No one imagines
that because a man is accused he must therefore, of course, be tried.
Public prosecutions are not devised for the purpose of indemnifying the
wrongs of individnals, still less of retaliating them.

Many other decisions by the circuit and district courts
to the same purport are to be found, among them the
following: Exparle Robisoz (1855), U. S. C. Ct., D. Ohio,
6 McLean 355 ; U. S. v. failer of Fai'elle Co. (1867), U. S.
C. Ct., D. Ky., 2 Abb. 265; Ramsey v. Jailer of Warren
Co. (1879), U. S. D. Ct., D. Ky., 2 Flip. 451 ; it re Nel
(1871), U. S. C. Ct., S. D. N. Y., 8 Blatchf. 156; Ex liarle
Bridges (1875), U. S. C. Ct., N. D. Ga., 2 Woods, 428 ; EX
Similar language was
1ParleRoyall (1886), II7 U. S. 241.
used by Mr. Choate in the Senate of the United States upon
the passage of the act of 1842. He said

694

CUNNINGHAM,

SHERIFF V. NEAGLE.

If you have the power to interpose after judgment, you have thepower
to do so before. If you can reverse a judgment, you can anticipate its
rendition. If, within the Constitution, your judicial power extends to
these cases or these controversies, whether you take hold of the case or
controversy at one stage or another is totally immaterial. The single
question submitted to the national tribunal, the question whether, under
-thestatute adopting the law of nations, the prisoner is entitled to the
exemption or immunity he claims, may as well be extractedfrom the entire case, and presented and decided in those tribunals before any judgment in the State court, as for it to be revised afterwards on a writ of
terror. Bither way, they pass on no other question. Either way they do
not administer the criminal law of a State. In the one case as much as
-n the other, and no more, do they interfere with State judicial power.

The same answer is given in the present case. To the objection, made in argument, that the prisoner is discharged
by this writ from the power of the StAte court to try him for
the whole offense, the reply is that if the prisoner is held in
the State court to answer for an act which he was authorized
to do by the law of the United States, which it was his duty
to do as Marshal of the United States, and if, in doing that
act, he did no more than what was necessary and proper for
him to do, he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law of
the State of California. When these things are shown, it is
established that he is innocent of any crime against the laws
of the State, or of any other authority whatever. There is
mo occasion for any further trial in the State court, or in any
,court. The Circuit Court of the United States was as competent to ascertain these facts as any other tribunal, and it
was not at all necessary that a jury should be impaneled to
-xender a verdict on them. It is the exercise of a power
,common under all systems of criminal jurisprudence. There
nnst always be a preliminary examination by a committing
-magistrate, or some similar authority, as to whether there is
an offense to be submitted to a jury; and, if this is subinitted in the first instance to a grand jury, that is still not
the right of trial by jury which is insisted on in the present
argument.

We have thus given, in this case, a most attentive consideration to all the questions of law and fact which we have
thought to be properly involved in it. We have felt it to be our
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duty to examine intc the facts with a completeness justified
by the importance of the case, as well as from the duty imposed upon us by the statute, which we think requires of us
to place ourselves, as far as possible, in the place of the Circuit Court, and to examine the testimony and the arguments
in it, and to dispose of the party as law and justice require.
The result at which we have arrived upon this examination
is that, in the protection of the person and the life of Mr.
Justice FIELD while in the discharge of his official duties,
Neagle was authorized to resist the attack of Terry upon
him; that Neagle was correct in the belief that, without
prompt action on his part, the assault of Terry upon the
Judge would have ended in the. death of the latter; that,
such being his well-founded belief, he was justified in taking
the life of Terry, as the only means of preventing the death
of the man who was intended to be his victim; that in taking the life of Terry, under the circumstances, he was acting under the authority of the law of the United States, and
was justified in so doing; and that he is not liable to answer
in the courts of California on account of his part in that
transaction.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court
authorizing his discharge from the custody of the Sheriff of
San Joaquin county.
FIELD, J., did not sit at the hearing of this case, and took
no part in its decision.
LAMAR, J., (dissenting). The Chief Justice and myself
are unable to assent to the conclusion reached by the majority of the Court. Our dissent is not based on any conviction as to the guilt or innocence of the appellee. The view
which we take renders that. question immaterial to the inquiry presented by this appeal. That inquiry is, whether the
appellee, Neagle, shall in this ex pare proceeding be discharged and delivered from any trial or further inquiry in
any court, State or federal, for what he has been accused of
in the forms prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the
State in which the act in question was committed. Upon
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that issue, we hold to the principle announced by this court
in the case of Ex 1 5arle Crouch (1884), ii2 U. S. 178, i8o,
in which Mr. Chief Justice WAITE, delivering the opinion
of the Court, said
It is elementary learning that, if a prisoner is in the custody of a State
court of competent jurisdiction, not illegally asserted, he cannot be taken
from that jurisdiction and discharged on habeascorpus issued by a court
of the United States simply because he is not guilty of the offense for
which he is held. All questions which may arise in the orderly course of
the proceeding against him are to be determined by the court to whose
jurisdiction he has been subjected, and no other court is authorized to interfere to prevent it. Here the right of the prisoner to a discharge depends alone on the sufficiency of his defense to the information under
which he is held. Whether his defense is sufficient or not is forthe court
which tries him to determine. If, in this determination, errors are committed, they can only be corrected in an appropriate form of proceeding
for that purpose. The office of a writ of habeas corpus is neither to correct such errors, nor to take the prisoner away from the court which holds
him for trial, for fear, if he remains, they may be committed. Authorities
to this effect in our reports are numerous: Ex parle Watkins (1830), 3
Pet. (28 U. S.) 202 ; Exfarte Lange (1873), iS Wall. (85 U. S.) 163, 166 ;
ExparleParks (1876), 93 U. S. 18, 23 ; Ex parle Siebold (1879), 1oo Id.
371, 374; E- parle Virginia (1879), Id. 339, 343; Ex parle Rowland
(1881), 104 Id. 6o4, 612 ; Ex pare Curtis (1882), 1o6 Id. 371, 375 ; Ex
pare Yarbroughz,(1884), io Id. 651, 653.

Many of the propositions advanced in behalf of the appellee, and urged with impressive force, we do not challenge.
We do not question, for instance, the soundness of the elaborate discussion of the history of the office and function of
the writ of hbeas corpus, its operation under and by virtue

of Section 753 of the Revised Statutes, or the propriety of
its use in the manner and for the purposes for which it has
been used in any case where the prisoner is under ariest by
a State for an act done "in pursuance of a law of the United
States." Nor do we contend that any objection arises to
such use of the writ, and based merely on that fact, in cases
where no provision is made by the federal law for the trial
and conviction of the accused. Nor do we question the general propositions that the federal government established by
the .Constitution is absolutely sovereign over every foot of
soil and over every person within the national territory,
within the sphere of action assigned to it; and that within
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that sphere its Constitution and laws are the supreme lawof the land, and its proper instrumentalities of government
can be subjected to no restraint, and can be held to no accountability whatever. Nor, again, do we dispute the proposition that whatever is necessarily implied in the Constitution and laws of the United States is as much a part of
them as if it were actually expressed. All these questions
we pretermit. The recognition by this Court, including
ourselves, of their soundness, does not in the least elucidate
the case; for they lie outside of the true controversy.
The ground on which we dissent, and which in and by
itself seems to be fatal to the case of the appellee, is this:
that, in treating Section 753 of the Revised Statutes as an
act of authority for this particular use of the writ, a wholly
inadmissible construction is placed on the word "law," as
used in that statute, and a wholly inadmissible application
is.
made of the clause "in custody in violation of the Constitution * * * of the United States." It will not be
necessary to consider these two propositions separately, for
they are called into this case as practically one. The section
referred to is as follows:
The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail,
unless where he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States, or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is
in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United
States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the
United States, etc.

It is not contended in behalf of the appellee that the writ
of habeas corpus could be used, as here it is, in any case,

without authority of a statute. In Ex Parle Boilman
(1807), 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 75, 94, Chief Justice MARSHALL
said:
The power to award the writ [of habeascorfius] by any of the courts of
the United States must be given by written law.

It is not contended that there is any statute other than
those now found in the Revised Statutes of the United
States. Nor is it contended that in those statutes there is
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any authority for the use here made of the writ other than
what is embraced in the clauses above quoted. The issue,
as stated above, is thus narrowed to the proper force to be
attributed to those clauses.
It is stated as the vital position in appellee's case, that it
is not supposed that any special act of Congress exists which
authorizes the marshals or deputy-marshals of the United
States, in express terms, to accompany the judges of the
Supreme Court through their circuits, and act as a bodyguard to them, to defend them against malicious assaults
against their persons; that, in the view taken of the Constitution of the United States, any obligation fairly and properly
inferable from that instrument, or any duty of the marshal
to be derived from the general scope of his duties under the
laws of the United States, is "a law," within the meaning of
this phrase; and that it would be a great reproach to the
system of government of the United States, declared to be
within its sphere sovereign and supreme, if there was to be
found within the domain of its powers no means of protecting the judges, in the conscientious and faithful discharge of
their duties, from the malice and hatred of those upon whom
their judgments might operate unfavorably. In considering
this position, it is indispensable to observe carefully the distinction between the individual man, Neagle, and the same
person in his official capacity as a deputy-marshal of the
United States, and also the individual man whose life he
defended, and the same person in his official capacity of a
Circuit Justice of the United States. The practical importance of the distinction between the rights and liabilities of
.a person in his private character and the authority and immunity of the same person in his official capacity is clearly
pointed out and illustrated in U. S. v. Airby (i868), 7 Wall.
,(74 U. S.) 482, 486, in which the court says:
No officer or employe of the United States is placed by his position, or
-the services he is called to perform, above responsibility to the legal
tribunals of the country, and to the ordinary processes for his arrest and
detention, when accused of felony, in the forms prescribed by the Constitution andlaws. [And the court adds:] Indeed, it maybe doubted whether
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it is competent for Congress to exempt the employes of the United States
from arrest on criminal process from the State courts, when the crimes
charged against them are not merely mnalafrokibita,but are malr in se.
But, whether legislation of that character be Constitutional or not, no intention to extend such exemption should be attributed to Congress, unless
clearly manifested by its language.

Now, we agree, taking the facts of the case as they are
shown by the record, that the personal protection of Mr.
Justice FIELD as a private citizen, even to the death of Terry,
was not only the right, but was also the duty, of Neagle,
and of any other by-stander; and we maintain that for the
exercise of that right or duty he is answerable to the courts
of the State of California, and to them alone. But we deny
that, upon the facts of this record, he, as Deputy-Marshal
Neagle, or as Private Citizen Neagle, had any duty imposed
on him by the laws of the United States growing out of the
official character of Judge FIELD as a Circuit Justice. We
deny that anywhere in this transaction, accepting throughout the appellee's version of the facts, he occupied in law
any position other than what would have been occupied by
any other person who should have interfered in the same
manner, in any other assault of the same character, between
any two other persons in that room. In short, we think
that there was nothing whatever, in fact, of an official character in the transaction, whatever may have been the appellee's view of his alleged official duties and powers; and,
therefore, we think that the courts of the United States have,
in the present state of our legislation, no jurisdiction whatever in the premises, and that the appellee should have been
remanded to the custody of the Sheriff.
The contention of the appellee, however, is, that it was his
official duty, as United States Marshal, to protect the Justice;
and that for so doing, in discharge of this duty, "which
could only arise under the laws of the United States," his
detention by the State courts brings the case within section
753 of the Revised Statutes, as aforesaid. We shall therefore address ourselves, as briefly as is consistent with the
gravity of the question involved, to a consideration of the
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justice of that claim. We must, however, call attention
again to .the formal and deliberate admission that it is not
pretended that there is any single, specific statute making it,
in so many words, Neagle's duty to protect the Justice. The
position assumed is, and is wholly, that the authority and
duty to protect the Justice did arise directly and necessarily
.out of the Constitution and positive Congressional enactments.
The Attorney General of the United States has appeared
in this case for the appellee, in behalf of the government; and,
in order that the grounds upon which the government relies
in support of its claim against the State of California, that
Neagle should be discharged on this writ, may fully appear,
it is proper to give some of his most important propositions
in his own language. Ie maintains thatIt was the duty of the judiciary, having been thus protected by the executive department, to sit in judgment upon and to vindicate the officer
of the executive department, if innocent, in the discharge of his duty, because such authority in the federal judiciary is essential, in principle, to
the existence of the nation.
We insist that, by the Constitution of the United States, a government
was created, possessed of all the powers necessary to existence as an independent nation; that these powers were distributed in three great Constitutional Departments; and that each of these Departments is by that
Constitution invested with all of those governmental powers naturally belonging to such Department which have not been expressly withheld by
the terms of the Constitution.
In other words, that Congress is invested not only with expressed, but
with implied, legislative powers; that the judiciary is invested not only
with express powers granted in the Constitution as its share of the government, but with all the judicial powers which have not been expressly
witheld from it; and that the President, in like manner, by the very fact
that he is made the Chief Executive of the nation, and is charged to protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution, and to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, is invested with necessary and implied executive
powers which neither of the other branches of the government can either
take away or abridge; that many of these powers, pertaining to each
branch ofthe government, are self-executing, and in no way dependent,
except as to the ways and means, upon legislation.
The Constitution provides that before the President enters upon the
execution of his office he shall take an oath: 'I do solemnly swear that
Iwill faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and
will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu.
tion of the United States ' [And he asks:] Has this clause no signifi-
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cance? Does it not, by necessary implication, invest the President with
self-executing powers-that is, powers independent of statute?

In reply to these propositions, we have this to say: We
recognize that the powers of the government, "within its
sphere," as defined by the Constitution and interpreted by
the well-settled principles which have resulted from a century of wise and patriotic analysis, are supreme; that these
supreme powers extend to the protection of itself and all of
its agencies, as well as to the preservation and the perpetuation of its usefulness; and that these powers may be found
not only in the express authorities conferred by the Constitution, but also in necessary and proper implications. But,
while that is all true, it is also true that the powers must be
exercised not only by the organs, but also in conformity with
the modes, prescribed by the Constitution itself. These
great federal powers, whose existence in all their plenitude
and energy is incontestable, are not autocratic and lawless.
They are organized powers committed by the people to the
hands of their servants for their own government, and distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments. They are not extra the Constitution; for, in
and by that Constitution, and in and by it alone, the United
States, as a great, democratic, federal republic, was called
into existence, and finds its continued existence possible. In
that instrument is found not only the answer to the general
line of argument pursued in this case, but also to the specific
question propounded by the Attorney General in respect to
the President's oath, and its implications.
The President is sworn to "preserve, protect, and defend
the Constitution." That oath has great significance. The
sections which follow that prescribing the oath (Sections 2
and 3 of Axticle 2) prescribe the duties and fix the powers of
the President. But one very prominent feature of the Constitution which he is sworn to preserve, and which the
whole body of the judiciary are bound to enforce, is the closing paragraph of section 8, art. I, in which it is declared
that-
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The Congress shall have power * : ' to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

This clause is that which contains the germ of all the implication of powers under the Constitution. It is that which
has built up the Congress of the United States into the most
august and imposing legislative assembly in the world, and
which has secured vigor to the practical operations of the
government, and at the same time tended largely to preserve
the equilibrium of its various powers among its co-ordinate
departments, as partitioned by that instrument. And that
clause alone conclusively refutes the assertion of the Attorney
General that it was "the duty of the Executive Department
of the United States to guard and protect at any hazard the
life of Mr. Justice FIELD in the discharge of his duty, because such protection is essential to the existence of the
government." Waiving the question of the essentiality of
any such protection to the existence of the government, the
manifest answer is that the protection needed and to be given
must proceed not from the President, but primarily from
Congress.
Again, while it is the President's duty to take care 'that
the laws be faithfully executed, it is not his duty to make
laws or a law of the United States. The laws he is to see
executed are manifestly those contained in the Constitution
and those enacted by Congress, whose duty it is to make all
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
powers of those tribunals. In fact, for the President to have
undertaken to make any law of the United States pertinent
to this matter would have been to invade the domain of
power expressly committed by the Constitution exclusively
to Congress. That body was perfectly able to pass such laws
as it should deem expedient in reference to such matter.
Indeed, it has passed such laws in reference to elections, expressly directing the United States Marshals to attend places
of election, to act as peace-officers, to arrest with and without process, and to protect the supervisors of election in the

CUNNINGHAM,

SHERIFF V. NEAGLE.

703

discharge of their duties; and there was not the slightest
legal necessity out of which to imply any such power in the
President. For these reasons, the letters of the Attorney
General to Marshal Franks, granting that they did import
what is claimed, and granting that the Attorney G&neral was
to all intents and purposes, firo hac vice, the- President, invested Neagle with no special powers whatever. They were,
if so construed, without authority of law; and Neagle was
then and there a simple 'Deputy-Marshal-no more and no,
less.
To illustrate the large sphere of powers self-executing and
independent of statutes claimed to be vested in the Executive, reference is made to the continually recurring cases of
the President's interference for the protection of our foreign
born and naturalized citizens on a visit to their native country; and we are cited, as a striking instance of the exercise
of such power, to the case of Martin Kozsta, who, though
not fully a naturalized citizen of the United States, had in
due form of law made his declaration of intention to become
a citizen, and who, while at Smyrna, was seized by order of
an Austrian official and confined on board an Austrian vessel,
and who, being afterwards delivered up to Captain Ingraham, commanding an American war vessel, in compliance
with a demand backed by a demonstration of force on the
part of that officer, was placed in the hands of a French
consul subject to negotiations between the American and
Austrian governments, resulting in the famous correspondence between the American Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy,
and the Chevalier Hulsemann, representing the Austrian
government, and the restoration of Kozsta to freedom. We
are asked; upon what express statute of Congress then existing can this act of the govermuent be justified? We
answer, that such action of the government was justified because it pertained to the foreign relations of the United
States, in respect to which the federal government is the
exclusive representative and embodiment of the entire sovereignty of the nation, in its united character; for to foreign
nations, and in our intercourse with them, States and State
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governments, and even the internal adjustment of federal
power, with its complex system of checks and balances, are
unknown, and the only authority those nations are permitted
to deal with is the authority of the nation as a unit. That
authority the Constitution vests expressly and conclusively
in the treaty-making power, the President and Senate, by
-one simple and comprehensive grant.
He [the President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
_present concur.

This broad grant makes enumeration of particular powers
unnecessary. All other delegations of powers in reference to
the international relations of this country are carefully and
specifically enumerated and assigned, one by one, to their
,designated departments. In reply, therefore, to the question,
what law expressly justifies such action? we answer, the
.organic law, the Constitution, which expressly commits all
-matters pertaining to our diplomatic negotiations to the
treaty-making power.
Other cases are referred to in illustration of the same point;
'but the one which it is alleged presents that principle in the
most imposing form is that of U. S. v. Tin Co. (i888), 125
U. S. 273. In that case a suit was brought in the name of
the United States, by order of the Attorney General, to set
.aside a patent which had been issued for a large body of
land, on the ground that it had been obtained from the
government by fraud and deceit practiced upon its officers.
There are, it is true, some expressions in the opinion delivered in that case which seem to admit that there is no
specific act of Congress expressly authorizing the Attorney
General to bring suit for the annulment of a patent procured
by fraud from the government; but a close examination of
the doctrine of the Court shows that it goes no further than
the assertion that the authority of the Attorney General
.arises, by implication, directly and immediately, out of the
express law of Congress. The opinion quotes the clause of
the Constitution which declares that the judicial power shall
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exten6 to all cases to which the United States shall be a
party, and says that this means, mainly, where it is a party
plaintiff. It then refers to the statute of Congress which expressly directs the United States district attorneys to bring
suits in behalf of the government, and that the suits thus
brought by them are to be under the immediate superintendence and control of the Attorney General. The'utmost extent to which the court goes is that, while admitting there
is no express authority in the Attorney General to institute
the suit, yet such authority is directly and necessarily involved in the express provisions of the statute vesting him
with the entire control and superintendence of such suits,
and the provision and control of the district attorneys in
their conduct of them.
Equally conclusive is the answer which the Constitution

makes to the assertion that by the Constitution the judiciary
is invested not only with the express powers granted in the
Constitution as its share of the government, but with all the
judicial powers which have not been expressly withheld from
it. It may be found in the clause which declares that "the
Congress shall have power

*

*

*

to constitute tribunals

inferior to the Supreme Court," and in that which declares
it shall make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the powers of those tribunals. The correlation
between those clauses is manifest and unmistakable. If
Congress can and must, by the very terms of the Constitution, make all laws proper for carrying into execution all
the powers of any department of the government, and if it
can create the circuit court, expand its powers, abridge them,
and abolish the court, at will, how can it be that that court,
at the least, shall have any implied powers derived from the
Constitution and independent of the statutes? And yet in
this transaction it must be remembered that Mr. Justice
FIELD is only claimed to be the representative of that court.
Not only do the foregoing views seem to us to be the
logical and unavoidable results of original and independent
studies of the Constitution, but they are also sustained and
VOL. XXXVIII.-45.
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enforced by a long series of judicial recognitions and assertions. In U. S. v. Fisher (1804), 2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 358,

396, Chief Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion of
the court, said of the clause above relied on:
In construing this clause, it would be incorrect, and would produce
endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was
authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specifled power. Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose,
it might be said with respect to each that it was not necessary, because
the end might be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the
choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in
fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution.

In fcCzilloch v. Maryland(I819), 4 Wheat (17 U. S.)
316, 420, 421, Chief Justice MARSHALL, for the court, delivered one of those opinions -which are among the chief
ornaments of American jurisprudence. It is largely devoted
to an exhaustive analysis of the ConstitutionL clause in
question. Among other things, he says:
The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed
upon this clause is that, if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to
restrain, the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the legislature
to exercise its bestjudgment in the selection of measures to carry into
execution the Constitutional powers of the government. If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast
mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the Constitution, if
that instrument be not a splendid bauble. We admit, as all must admit,
that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not
to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to
the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution
which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in
the manner most beneficial to the people.

In U. S. v. Reese (1876), 92 U. S. 214, 217, ChiefJustice
WAITE, delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution
of the United States can be protected by Congress. The form and the
manner of the protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exerelse of its legislative discretion, shall provide. These may be varied to
meet the necessities of the particular right to be protected.

In Strauder v. Wesi Virginia (188o), 100 U. S. 303, 310,
the Court say:
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A right or an immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only
guarantied by it, even without any express delegation of power, may be
protected by Congress.

Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 1*9,
collates from the numerous adjudications of this Court, cited
by him, the following principles:
So far as that instrument [the Constitution] apportions powers to thenational judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part, as simply
authorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation for the exercise of
those powers by the federal courts, and not as directly, of its own force,
vesting them with that authority. The Constitution does not, of its own.
force, give to national courts jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates ; but an act of Congress is essential, first, to create courts, anti
afterwards to apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are
of those few cases of which the Constitution confers jurisdiction upon the
Supreme Court by name ; and, although the courts of the United States
administer the common law in many cases, they do not derive authority
from the common law to take cognizance of and punish offenses against
the government. Offenses against the nation are defined, and their punishment prescribed, by acts of Congress.

In a note to this paragraph he says:
Demurrer to an indictment for libel upon the President and Congress.
By the Court: "The only question which this case presents is whether
the circuit courts can exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal
cases. * * * The general acquiescence of legal men shows the pre-.
valence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition. The course
of reasoning wtiich leads to this conclusion is simple, obvious, and admits
of but little illustration. The powers of the general governmentare made
up of concessions from the several States. Whatever is not expressly
given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. * * * It is not necessary to inquire whether the general government, in any and to what
extent, possesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in
cases similar to the present. It is enough that such jurisdiction has not
been conf rred by any legislative act, if it does not result to those courts.
as a consequence of their creation: " U. S. v. Hedson (1812), 7 Cranch.
(II U. S.) 32. See U.S. v. Coolidge (1816), 1 Wheat. (14 U. S.) 415.
11It is clear there can be no common law of the United States. Thefederat
government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent
States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and common
law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the
Union. The common law could be made a part of our federal system only
Per McLiAN, J., Wheaton v. Peters(1834),
by legislative adoption :"
8 Pet. (33 U. S.) 658; and citing many other authorities.
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In Tennessee v. Davis (i88o), 100 U. S. 257, 267, referring
to the judiciary act of 1789, the Court said:
It [the Constitution] did not attempt to confer upon the federal courts
.all the judicial power vested in the government. Additional grants have
from time to time been made.

Congress has authorized more and more

fully, as occasion has required, etc.

It would seem plain, therefore, that if the Constitution
means anything, and if these judicial utterances, extending,
as they do, over a period of eighty years, and embracing a
variety of interests, mean anything, they mean that the
power to provide and prescribe the laws necessary to effectuate the governmental and official powers of the United
States and its officers is vested in Congress.
The gravamen of this case is in the assertion that Neagle
slew Terry in pursuance of a law of the United States. He
-who claims to have committed a homicide by authority,
-mustshow the authority. If he claims the authority of law,
then what law? And if a law, how came it to be a law?
Somehow and somewhere it must have had an origin. Is it
a law because of the existence of a special and private anthority issued from one of the executive departments? So,
in almost these words, it isclaimed in this case. Is it a law
because of some Constitutional investiture of sovereignty in
the persons ofjudges, who carry that sovereignty with them
-wherever they may go? Because of some power inherent
in the judiciary to create for others a rule or law of conduct
outside of legislation, which shall extend to the death
penalty? So, also, in this case, in lo/idem verbis, -it is
,claimed. We dissent from both these claims. There can
-be no such law from either of those sources. The right
,.claimed must be traced to legislation of Congress, else it
cannot exist. If it be said that Congress, has the power to
-make such laws, yet, in the absence of statutes from that
source, other departments may act in the premises; or if it
'besaid that the possession of that power by the government
,does not negative the existence of similar powers in other
departments of the government-the response that these
powers are plainly not concurrent, btxt are exclusive, can be
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made in the language of Mr. Justice STORY, in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania (i842), 16 Pet. (41 U. S.) 539, 6x7. Speaking
of the fugitive slave law of 1793, he'says:
If Congress have a Constitutional power to regulate a particular subject,
and they do actually regulate it in a given manner and in a certain form,
*

*

-

in such a case the legislation of Congress, in what it does pre-

scribe, manifestly indicates that it does not intend that there shall be any
further legislation to act upon the subject-matter. Its silence as to what
it does not do is as expressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions made by it.

If it be said that that case had reference to the interference
of a State with Congressional powers, while in the case at
bar no such question is involved, the answer is that the difference is favorable, and not adverse, to the theory of this
opinion. The principle is the same; and, if that principle
can be applied, as applied it was, to the denial to a State
legislature of the powers previously enjoyed over matters
originally appertaining to it, a muliofortioriwill it apply to
the exclusion of two co-ordinate departments of the same
government from powers which they never possessed.
As before stated, if the killing of Terry was done "in pursuance of a law of the United States," that law had somewhere an origin. There are, under the general government,
only two possible sources of law. The common law never
existed in our federal system. The legislative power possessed
by the United States must be found either exercised in the
Constitution as fundamental law, or by some body or person
to whom it was delegated by the Constitution. It has
already been pointed out that the Constitution does not itself
create any such law as that contended for, and that it could
not have been created by any executive or judicial action or
status is made manifest, not only by the clause in Section 8,
Art. I, already cited and commented on, but also by Section
I, Art. i, and the two paragraphs of Article 6. Section i,
Art. I, provides thatAll legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
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-The second paragraph of Article 6 provides that'The laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof,
-and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.

Now, what is it that constitutes the supreme laws of which
so much is said in this case? How distinctly, how plainly,
and how fully the Constitution answers. The Constitution
itself, the treaties, and the laws made in pursuance of the
Constitution. Made by whom? By Congress, manifestly.
The two clauses already quoted give the power of legislation in the most sweeping terms. It alone has power to
make any law. Anything purporting to be a law not enacted by Congress would not be "in pursuance of" any provision of the Constitution. Thus we are driven to look for
the source of this asserted law to some legislation of Congress,
legislation made under either its express Constitutional
authority, or under its properly implied authority-it is immaterial which; and there is none of either class. The authority is sought to be traced here through the self-preservative power of the federal judiciary implied from the Constitution, and then through the obligation of the Executive to
protect the judges, implied from the Constitution, whereas
there is no such implication in either case, for the simple
biut all-sufficient reason that by the Constitution itself, the
whole of those functions is committed to Congress.
Since then, the Constitution did not, by its own direct
provisions, regulate this matter, but committed it to the
hands of Congress, with full powers in the premises, it is
only by the enactment of some law of Congress that the appellee can show that he is in custody "in violation of the
Constitution."
As previously remarked, the two propositions are, as to
this case, essentially one. Turning again to the statute
under which the writ is sued out, we find that the clause
relied on is that which makes the writ applicable where the
person "is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuThe question then
.ance of a law of the United States."
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What does the expression import?

Is it not plain that it means just what the same expression
all through the Constitution imports? If that instrument,
which is the fountain of the federal power, be consulted, it
will be found that in it, and the amendments thereto, the
word "law," in either its singular form or its plural, "laws,"
is used forty-two times. Of these instances of that use, sixteen are where the word is used in reference to the jurisprudence of the States and of the law of nations, or where they
are merely terms of description, such as "courts of law,"
"cases in law and equity," etc. Of the other instances of its
use, and which all have reference to that body of rules which
constitute the jurisprudence distinctly of the United States,
there are only three cases in which it is not manifest that
the word is used as equivalent to "statutes," "enactments of
the Congress;" and it is clear, in those three instances, the
word is used, also, as equivalent to "statutes."
The following are examples:
The Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations
[in regard to the election of Senators and Representatives]. Article I, 4.
Every bill * - " shall, before it become a law, be presented, etc.
Article x, 7.
Congress shall have power * *
to establish *
* uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies, etc. Article I, 8.
Congress shall have power * * * to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper, etc. Article i, .S.
No bill of attainder or exfioslfacto law shall be passed. Article i, 9
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
First Amendment.

It would be tedious, and it is unnecessary, to set them all
forth. They all have the same manifest meaning of "statutes," except three, and in those three instances, the words do
not mean anything other than statutes. We think it plain
that the expression, "a law of the United States," as used in
Section 753 of the Revised Statutes, means just what the
similar expression means all through the Constitution, and
that is, "a statute of the United States:" Tennessee v. Davis
(188o), OO U. S. 264.
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Of the decisions of this Court, cited as authority to sustain the order discharging the appellee, Ex jarte Sebold
(i88o), ioo U. S. 371, and Tennessee v. Davis, szora, are
relied on as having the most direct bearing on the case. We
do not consider Ex lare Siebold as being adverse to the
proposition which we maintain. In that case, the existence
of express statutes upon which the controversy arose was un.disputed. The sole question was as to the Constitutional
competency of Congress to pass certain laws which, in the
most express, explicit, and imperative words, required marshals and deputy-marshals of the United States to attend
places for the election of members of Congress, to keep the
peace at the polls, make arrests, and protect the supervising
6fficers in the discharge of their duties at those elections.
The Court decided that the enactments of Congress in question were Constitutional. The power of Congress to passthese laws being thus settled, no assertion as to the
powers of the marshals and deputy-marshals to execute them
in the States can be found in that able opinion which do
not follow as a logical consequence. We fail to see anywhere in the decision any intimation that, independently of
such legislation, the officers therein named could, by virtue
of their office, have exercised the same powers in obedience
to the instructions of an executive department, in the exercise of its authority implied from the Constitution. In
Tennessee v. Davis, the case was removed from a State
court to the circuit court of the United States under the express provisions of Section' 643 of the Revised Statutes. The
homicide for which the petitioner was prosecuted, was committed by him while executing his duties as a revenue officer, in pursuance of the express requirements of the reve nue laws, and in defense of his own life, upon a party offering unlawful resistance. So far from running counter to
the position we are seeking to maintain, we think the principle there laid down on the point we are now discussing is
in accord with that position. The language of the' court,
through Mr. Justice STRONG, who delivered its opinion, is.
as follows:-
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Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow
out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or
privilege, or claim or protection, or defense of the party, in whole or in
part, by whom they are asserted: 2 Story, Const. 1647; Colhens v. Virginia (1821), 6 Wheat. (19 U. S.) 379.

While it is true that the opinions in both of those cases
assert in the strongest and most impressive language the
supremacy of the government of the United States in the
exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution,
we regard them, also, as a vindication of Congress as the
law-making department of the government, as the depository of the implied and constructive powers of the government, or, as Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL expresses it, of
the power "to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers
which must be involved in the Constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble." As the Siebold Case and
Tennessee v. Davis have been referred to as the most important and directly in point in support of the opposite view,
we do not deem it necessary to give an extended examination
of the series of cases decided by the circuit and district courts
cited to the same purport. Ex tarle Jenkins (1853), U. S.
C. Ct., E. D. Pa., 2 Wall. Jr. 521, to which attention is more
especially called, combined in itself the main features
of most of the others, which were proceedings under the
fugitive slave law, in which United States marshals were
arrested while executing process under that law by State officers acting under the authority of the statutes of the State,
the inevitable effect, if not the avowed object, of which
were to nullify the operation of the aforesaid act of Congress. This was so in ExfiarteJenkins. The United States
Marshal was arrested on a warrant issued by a State magistrate while he was executing a warrant issued under said law
of Congress. He was brought before the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
on a writ of habeas corfius, and was discharged upon the
ground that the fugitive slave law, having been enacted in
pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, was
paramount to the law of Pennsylvania in conflict with it,
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and that the Marshal, being in custody for an act done in
pursuance of that law of Congress, and in execution of process under it, was entitled to his discharge. It is so manifest
that that case was within the provision of Section 753 of
the Revised Statutes, that further comment is unnecessary,
and the same may be said of all of the other decisions of the
circuit and district courts. In every one of them the party
discharged was in custody either for an act done in pursuance
of an express statute of Congress, or in the execution of a
decree, order, or process of a court, or the custody was in
-violation of the Constitution of the United States.
We stated at the outset of these remarks that we raised no
question upon the discussion of the history of the legislation of Congress upon the subject of the writ of habeas
orpius. We think, however, it is pertinent, in this connection, to inquire what was the necessity for any such legislation at all, if the theory contended for as to the sufficiency
of the self-executing powers of the executive and judicial
departments of the government to protect all the agencies
and instrumentalities of the federal government is correct.
Why could not President Jackson, in 1833, as the head of
the executive department, invested with the power, and
charged with the duty, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and to defend the Constitution, have enforced
the collection of the federal revenues in the port of Charleston, and have protected the revenue officers of the government against any arrest made under the pretensions of State
authority, without the aid of the act of 1833 ? Why, in
1842, when the third habeas cor.us act was passed, could not
the President' of the United States, by virtue of the same
self-executing powers of the Executive, together with those
of the judicial department, have enforced the international
obligations of the government without any such act of Congress? It is a noteworthy fact in our history that whenever the exigencies of the country, from time to time, have
required the exercise of executive and judicial power for the
enforcement of the supreme authority of the United States
government for the protection of its agencies, etc., it was

CUNNINGHAM,

SHERIFF V. NEAGLE.

found, in every instance, necessary to invoke the interposition of the power of the national legislature. As early as
1807, in Exparte BolIman (1807), 4 Cranch. (8 U. S.) 75,
94, Chief Justice MARSHALL said:The power to award the writ [of habeas coripus] by any of the courts of
the United States must be given by written law. . ' * The inquiry,
therefore, on this motion, will be whether, by any statute compatible with
the Constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of
habeas cor uis in such case as that of Brick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout has been given to this court.

It is claimed that such a law is found in Section 787 of
the Revised Statutes, which is as follows:It shall be the duty of the marshal of each district to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and to execute throughout the
district all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority
of the United States; and he shall have power to command all necessary
assistance in the execution of his duty.

It is contended'that the duty imposed upon the marshal
of each district by this section is not satisfied by a mere
formal attendance upon the judges while on the bench; but
that it extends to the whole term of the courts while in session, and can fairly be construed as requiring him to attend
the judge while on his way from one court to another, to
perform his duty. It is manifest that the statute will bear
no such construction. In the first place, the judge is not the
court. The person does not embody the tribunal, nor does.
the tribunal follow him- in his journeys. In the second
place, the direction that he shall attend the court confers no
authority or power on him of any character. It is merely a
requirement that he shall be present, in person, at the court
when sitting, in order to receive the lawful commands of the
tribunal, and to discharge the duties elsewhere imposed upon
him. Great as the crime of Terry was in his assault upon
Mr. Justice FIELD, so far from its being a crime against the
court, it was not even a contempt of court, and could not
have received adequate punishment as such. Section 725
of the Revised Statutes limits contempt to cases of misbebavior in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice.
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It is claimed that the law needed for appellee's case can be
found in Section 788 of the Revised Statutes. That section
is as follows:The marshals and their deputies shall have in each State the same powers in executing the laws of the United States as the sheriffs and their
deputies in such State may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof.

It is then argued that, by the *Code of California, the
sheriff has extensive powers as a conservator of the peace,
the statutes to that effect being quoted i& exienso ; that he
also has certain additional common-law powers and obligations to protect the judges, and to personally attend them
on their visits to that State; that, therefore, no statutory
authgrity of the United States for the attendance on Mr.
Tustice FIELD by Neagle, and for Neagle's personal presence on the scene, was necessary; and that that statute constituted Neagle a peace-officer to keep the peace of the
United States. This line of argument seems to us wholly
untenable. By way of preliminary remark, it may be well
to say that, so far as the simple fact of NeagIe's attendance
on Mr. Justice FIELD, and the fact of his personal presence
are concerned, no authority, statutory or otherwise, was
needed. He had a right to be there; and, being there, no
matter how or why, if it became necessary to discharge an
official duty, he would be just as much entitled to the protection of Section 753 of the Revised Statutes as if he had
been discharging an official duty in going there. The fallacy in the use made of Section 788 in the argument just
outlined is this: That section gives to the officers named the
same measure of powers when in the discharge of their
duties as those possessed by the sheriffs, it is true ;'but it
does not alter the duties themselves. It does not empower
them to enlarge the scope of their labors and responsibilities,
but only adds to their efficiency within that scope. They
are still, by the very terms of the statute itself, limited to the
execution of "the laws of the United States," and are not in
any way, by adoption, mediate or immediate, from the Code
or the common law, authorized to execute the laws of Cali-
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fornia. The statute, therefore, leaves the matter just where
it found it
If the act of Terry had resulted in the death of Mr. Justice FIELD, would the murder of him have been a crime
against the United States? Would the government of the
United States, with all the supreme powers of which we
have heard so much in this discussion, have been competent,
in the present condition ofOits statutes, to prosecute in its
own tribunals the murder of its own Supreme Court Justice, or even to inquire into the heinous offense through its
own tribunals? If yes, then the slaying of Terry by the appellee, in the necessary prevention of such act, was authorized by the law of the United States, and he should be discharged, and that independently of any official character;
the situation being the same. in the case of any citizen.
But, if no, how stands the matter then? The killing of
Terry was not by the authority of the United States, no
matter by whom done, and the only authority relied on for
-vindication must be that of the State, and the slayer should
be remanded to the State courts to be tried. The question
then recurs, would it have been a crime against the United
States? There can be but one answer. Murder is not an offense against the United States except when committed on
the high seas or in some port or harbor without the jurisdiction of the State, or in the District of Columbia, or in the
Territories, or at other places where the national government has exclusive jurisdiction. It is well settled that such
crime must be defined by statute, and no such statute has
yet been pointed out. The United States government being
thus powerless to try and punish a man charged with murder, we are not prepared to affirm that it is omnipotent to
discharge from trial, and give immunity from any liability
to trial, where he is accused of murder, unles an express
statute of Congress is produced permitting such discharge.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in the foregoing
remarks we have not discussed the bearings of' this decision
upon the autonomy of the States, in divesting them of what
was once regarded as their exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
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committed within their own territory, against their own
laws, and in enabling a federal judge or court, by an order in
a habeas corbus proceeding, to deprive a State of its power
to maintain its own public order, or to protect the security of
society and the lives of its own citizens, whenever the
amenability to its courts of a federal officer or employe or
agent is sought to be enforced. We have not entered upon
that question because, as arising here, its suggestion is sufficient, and its consideration might involve the extent to
which legislation in that direction may Constitutionally go,
which could only be properly determined when directly
presented by the record in a case before the court for adjudication.
For these reasons, as briefly'stated as possible, we think
the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and the
prisoner remanded to the custody of the sheriff of San
Joaquin county, Cal.; and we are the less reluctant to express this conclusion because we cannot permit ourselves tc&
doubt that the authorities of the State of California are competent and willing to do justice, and that, even if the appellee had been indicted and had gone to trial upon this
record, God and his country would have given him a good
deliverance.
FULLER, C. J., concurred in this dissent.
When the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of California ordered Neagle's
discharge, the opinion of Circuit
judge SAwyER was printed in 28
A=RICAN LAW PMGISTER 585,
with an extended annotation on
the summary relief which a Court
of the United States could extend
to an officer of the United States
arrested by State authorities for
some act done in the performance
of his duty. Such collisions ought
not to occur, but the incidents of
the cases cited, as well as of this
Neagle case, show that they will occur as long as popular feeling is not

restrained by knowledge of the
law and of the consequences of disobedience ; see U. S. v. Doss (1872),
:n AmER. LAw RiG. (N. S.) 320
and 28 Id. 647.
The judgment of affirmance in
Neagle's case was unanimous upon
the power to release Neagle; supra
page 696. It was the importance of
this point together with the improbability of another ex-judge or
any citizen, so far forgetting the
necessary respect to the judiciary,
which caused the annotation in 28,
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 624-53,
to be confined to this fundamental
point. There could not have welL

